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ARTICLE

COPYRIGHT AS MARKET PROSPECT

SHYAMKRISHNA BALGANESH†
For many decades now, copyright jurisprudence and scholarship have looked to
the common law of torts—principally trespass and negligence—in order to
understand copyright’s structure of entitlement and liability. This focus on
property—and harm-based torts—has altogether ignored an area of tort law with
significant import for our understanding of copyright law: tortious interference with
a prospective economic advantage. This Article develops an understanding of
copyright law using tortious interference with a prospect as a homology. Tortious
interference with a prospect allows a plaintiff to recover when a defendant’s
volitional actions interfere with a potential economic benefit that was likely to accrue
to the plaintiff prior to the defendant’s intervention. Premised on the idea of a
probabilistic harm and driven by instrumental considerations, the tort works by
treating a possible market benefit as the basis of an interest that is worthy of
protection against specific behavior. As a supposed incentive for creativity, copyright
law operates in ways that are strikingly similar to tortious interference with a
prospect. Much like tortious interference with a prospect, it functions by first
identifying a zone of probabilistic market benefits, and then protecting that zone
against specific volitional interferences through a framework of liability. This Article
unpacks the strong analytical and normative parallels between the two, and argues
that their similarity sheds new and important light on several persistent puzzles
within current copyright jurisprudence.

† Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to Avi Bell, John
Goldberg, Justin Hughes, Umberto Izzo, Gideon Parchomovsky, Zahr Said, and participants at the
2017 NYU Tri-State IP Workshop, the 2017 IP Speaker Workshop at Loyola Law School Los
Angeles, the 2017 Private Law Consortium in Trento, and a faculty workshop at the University of
Washington for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are mine.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since its origins in the eighteenth-century, Anglo-American
copyright law has attempted to understand its entitlement structure through
the idea of property. Originally described as a form of “literary property,”1
1 See, e.g., MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 1-8 (1993)
(discussing the history of the concept of copyright as “literary property,” and describing how the 1710 Statute
of Anne established the author as a “legally empowered figure in the marketplace”); see also JODY GREENE,
THE TROUBLE WITH OWNERSHIP: LITERARY PROPERTY AND AUTHORIAL LIABILITY IN ENGLAND,
1660–1730 4 (2005) (“Insofar as the Act of Anne constituted a method for keeping track of those responsible
for literary works, it also put into effect a system for recording liability for them.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale
of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 991-92 (1990)
(“[O]ne of the ‘fundamental ideas’ of the revolutionary copyright laws is the principle that ‘an exclusive right
is conferred on authors because their property is the most justified because it flows from their intellectual
creation.’” (quoting CLAUDE COLUMBET, PROPRIÈTÈ LITTÈRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 8 (4th ed. 1988)));
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courts and scholars today continue to analyze copyright’s grant of exclusivity
through various doctrines from the common law of property.2 Ideas and
concepts deriving from trespass to land and chattels,3 the law of licenses,4 first
possession,5 choses in action,6 adverse possession,7 and more recently the law
of theft,8 feature rather routinely in copyright jurisprudence and scholarship.
Indeed, so pervasive is the influence of property thinking that the copyright
statute’s refusal to cover certain categories of works at one time even raised
concerns to some about “private property” being “taken” under the Fifth
Amendment.9 More recently, scholars have shifted their emphasis from the

Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain, 66 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 75 (2003) (“Embedded in this metaphor is an implicit narrative about the origin
of copyright, a version of the familiar Enlightenment narrative about the origin of landed property in
general.”).
2 For general criticisms of this trend, see generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking
Blackstonian Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 1126 (2009); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the PostIndustrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 141 (2011); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1996).
3 See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 217 (1985) (“It follows that interference with
copyright does not easily equate with theft, conversion, or fraud.”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 5 (2003) (“An
author’s right to ward off unauthorized copying of his work is much like a homeowner’s right to keep
trespassers off his land.”); Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass–Copyright Parallels and the Harm–Benefit
Distinction, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 62 (2009) (“[T]he cause of action known as ‘copyright
infringement’ possesses much the same structure as does trespass to land . . . .”).
4 See generally Christopher M. Newman, A License Is Not a “Contract Not To Sue”: Disentangling
Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1101, 1105 (2013) (explaining
that federal courts “have not hesitated to develop and apply principles of license construction
derived from federal copyright policy”).
5 See Richard Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright Law, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2005) (“To be sure, Locke did not offer any explicit treatment one way or
the other of intellectual property rights, which adds to his charm. But it hardly follows that his
theory has no implications for the area.”).
6 See Spencer Brodhurst, Is Copyright a Chose in Action?, 11 LAW Q. REV. 64 (1895) (“[I]t is very
doubtful whether rights, or in fact anything incorporeal, can properly be included [as a chose in action]
. . . .”); T.T. Cyprian Williams, Property, Things in Action, and Copyright, 11 LAW Q. REV. 223, 223 (1895)
(“[C]opyrights and similar rights are more analogous to choses in action than choses in possession . . . .”).
7 For a judicial opinion finding copyright title based on adverse possession, see O’Neill v. Gen.
Film Co., 152 N.Y.S. 599, 603 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff ’d as modified, 171 A.D. 854 (App. Div. 1916). But see
Matthew Daus, Adverse Possession of Copyright, 13 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 45, 57 (1992) (“The traditional
elements of adverse possession cannot successfully be applied to the acquisition of a copyright
because it is intangible property.”).
8 See, e.g., Irina D. Manta & Robert E. Wagner, Intellectual Property Infringement as Vandalism,
18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 331, 337-38 (2015) (“The IP owner, just like the property owner, generally
mixes her labor with pre-existing materials to provide society with goods and help it flourish . . . .
The more rivalrous intellectual property turns out to be in a given case, the more it resembles
property and the more its infringement parallels theft.”).
9 See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 162 (3d
ed. 2010) (“Some commentators [to the 1976 Copyright Act] expressed concern about . . . the
potential ‘takings’ arguments that might be raised.”).
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law of property to tort law to understand copyright.10 The move in this
direction was initially prompted by a focus on property torts—i.e., tort
doctrines that protect private property such as trespass—since courts
sporadically described copyright infringement actions in these terms.11 In due
course, the comparisons expanded to tort doctrines that were less about
property protection and more about balancing the plaintiff and defendant,
such as the doctrines of negligence and nuisance.12 This latter move was
underwritten by the increasingly instrumentalist and utilitarian orientation
that American copyright thinking has taken on in the last few decades, which
emphasizes the need to balance copyright protection against ease of access.13
The common law has thus proven to be a fertile source of conceptual guidance
for copyright jurisprudence.
All the same, copyright thinking has unduly limited itself in focusing
principally on property-based or balance-driven aspects of the common law
of torts. The focus on trespass, negligence, and nuisance—all mainstream and
well-understood doctrines—has certainly meant that copyright law has never
had to independently establish the legitimacy of the common law doctrines
to which it is looking; it has also limited such reliance almost entirely to the
structural realm. In other words, the common law has thus far proven to be
helpful in shedding light on how copyright law might develop mechanisms to
realize its underlying objectives that are predetermined. Yet the connection
has almost never been used to say anything of significance about the very
rationality, normative desirability, and construction of those objectives. This
is for an obvious reason: each of the common law areas hitherto used to
analyze copyright jurisprudence seeks to realize objectives that are illsuited—without significant adaptation—to those of copyright law.

10 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1569, 1573 (2009) (“[T]he common law has come to recognize that there are limits to human
predictive capacities . . . . Its principal device to that end is the concept of foreseeability.”); Oren
Bracha & Patrick Goold, Copyright Accidents, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1025, 1041 (2016) (“[C]opyright
accidents should be governed by a negligence rule.”); Patrick R. Goold, Unbundling the “Tort” of
Copyright Infringement, 102 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1888 (2016) (“[C]opyright infringement is composed of
five different torts, and this explains why infringement analysis is so changeable.”); Wendy J.
Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image: “Harms,” “Benefits,” and the Uses and Limits of Analogy,
34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533, 535 (2003).
11 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984)
(describing an infringer as “anyone who trespasses into [the copyright owner’s] exclusive domain by
using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work”); Coquico, Inc. v. Rodriguez-Miranda, 562 F.3d
62, 66 (1st Cir. 2009) (using the term “trespasses” to describe the action of infringing a copyright).
12 See generally Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 301 (2015); Steven Hetcher, The Fault Liability Standard in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 431 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed. 2013).
13 For a good summary of this utilitarian orientation and its effects, see ABRAHAM
DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? 17-53 (2015).
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Consider efforts to understand aspects of copyright law through
negligence doctrine. Negligence law is seen to be about deterring harmful
behavior,14 spreading the costs of harms once they occur,15 or realizing
corrective justice between the wrongdoer and the victim through a regime of
liability.16 Extended to copyright, each of these ideals proves to be grossly
incomplete. Unlike the tangible harm with which negligence commonly
concerns itself, the harm that copyright seeks to prevent is a contested and
multifaceted issue.17 Similarly, cost-spreading in copyright requires an account
of when and how something is a cost to begin with (rather than a benefit or an
accepted reality of human interaction) since the harm at issue in copyright is
either notional or predictive. Further, the ideal of corrective justice is itself
dependent on an underlying normative equilibrium that must be justified by
an altogether independent set of principles about rights and wrongs.18
Consequently, to the extent that concepts from negligence law are of utility to
copyright, their contribution lies primarily in their ability to structure
copyright doctrine and thinking. This is seen to allow copyright to further its
values that are in turn derived from other (i.e., non-common law) sources.
Copyright’s use of the common law has been principally in the form of a
structural analogy so far. Yet closely connected to, but nonetheless distinct
from an analogy, is the concept of a homology. An analogy focuses on a
resemblance between two or more concepts or ideas, but makes no claim as
to the relationship between the objects of the comparison.19 The similarity
14 See Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 657-58 (1975) (“In
terms of the goal of ‘optimal deterrence’ . . . [t]he injurer should avoid the accident whenever . . .
the accident prevention by him is socially more desirable.”); see also Steven Shavell, Strict Liability
Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1980).
15 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
39 (1970) (“The justification found most often among legal writers today for allocation of accident
losses on a nonfault basis is that accident losses will be least burdensome if they are spread broadly
among people and over time.”).
16 See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 58 (2003) (arguing that the principle
of corrective justice “best explains tort law”); see also ERNEST WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE (2012).
17 For an elaboration, see Wendy J. Gordon, The Concept of “Harm” in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW, supra note 10, at 452, 466 (“Harm is usually considered a
shortfall from some baseline . . . there are potentially an infinite number of possible baselines.”).
18 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normative Structure of Copyright Law, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW, supra note 10, at 313, 315 (“As an institution
that is just over three hundred years old, copyright has its own unique normative structure.”); Patrick
R. Goold, Corrective Justice and Copyright Infringement, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 251, 266-67 (2014)
(“Corrective justice theory views tort law as a system for correcting . . . wrongful losses and wrongful
gains.”); Gordon, supra note 10, at 535 (“As tort law . . . make[s] an actor reduce or stop his harmcausing activity, copyright law . . . make[s] an actor increase or continue his beneficial activity.”).
19 For the seminal work on analogy, see DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER & EMMANUEL SANDERS,
SURFACES AND ESSENCES: ANALOGY AS THE FUEL AND FIRE OF THINKING (2013). For work on
analogical reasoning in the law, see EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
1-28 (rev. ed. 2013); see also Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
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may be attributable—in its entirety—to coincidence. Consequently, the
process of analogizing one concept or doctrine to another requires no account
of why the comparison is independently justified, beyond the obvious
existence of the similarities at issue. Drawn from evolutionary thinking, a
homology on the other hand focuses on a resemblance between two or more
ideas but in addition makes an implicit claim about the common origins of
those ideas.20 It claims that the similarity under scrutiny is apparent because
of a commonality in source. That common source may be a shared
institutional origin or a shared set of motivating goals and ideals. As such,
the explanatory burden of a homology is significantly higher than that of a
mere analogy.
In this Article, I argue that the common law can be more than a structural
analogy for copyright thinking; it can also provide a useful homology for
copyright law. The basis for such a common law homology is to be found,
not in the well-worn doctrines of property and tort law, but instead in an
under-analyzed common law doctrine: tortious interference with a prospective
economic advantage. This doctrine is a close sibling of a claim known as tortious
interference with contract or “inducement to breach,” which allows recovery
when a third party defendant intentionally interferes with a contract between
two others and procures a breach.21 While inducement to breach is premised on
the existence of a valid contractual relationship between two parties,22 tortious
interference with a prospective economic advantage—or “tortious interference
with a prospect” for short—allows a claim when the economic benefit that was
interfered with by the defendant was itself entirely probabilistic. 23
While initially developed to render the defendant’s liability independent
of the formal validity of an underlying contract, tortious interference with a

REV. 1179, 1186 (1999) (“[T]he virtue of analogical reasoning lies in a variety of indirect benefits that
are likely to result when judges adopt it as a practice and consider themselves obliged to explain new
decisions in terms of their relation to past cases.”); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106
HARV. L. REV. 741 (2013) (“[F]our different but overlapping features . . . produce both the virtues
and the vices of analogical reasoning in the law.”).
20 See, e.g., STANLEY SHOSTAK, EVOLUTION OF SAMENESS AND DIFFERENCE 83 (1999)
(“[H]omologies connote similar molecules allegedly descendant from hypothetical ancestors . . . .”);
see also, e.g., MARY JANE WEST-EBERHARD, DEVELOPMENTAL PLASTICITY AND EVOLUTION
485-97 (2003) (“Homology-similarity due to common descent is the cornerstone of comparative
evolutionary research.”).
21 For early work on the scope and history of the doctrine, see generally Charles E. Carpenter,
Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728 (1928); Fowler V. Harper, Interference with
Contractual Relations, 47 NW. U. L. REV. 873 (1952).
22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“The
particular agreement must be in force and effect at the time of the breach that the actor has caused;
and if for any reason it is entirely void, there is no liability for causing its breach.”).
23 See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN AND ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 638 (2d ed. 2011).
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prospect has since expanded to cover a variety of other prospective
situations.24 In each of these situations, the law attempts to balance a
defendant’s behavior that caused the economic loss against a putative zone of
probable benefits that the plaintiff is seen as entitled to.25 Such balancing, in
turn, engages a variety of important considerations such as the bad faith of
the defendant, concerns about freeriding, the incentive effects of protection
(and non-protection), its effect on the general public interest and social
welfare, and concerns about the types and norms of competition in the market
at issue.26 In order to realize these goals contextually, tortious interference
with a prospect has come to develop a nuanced doctrinal structure that is
uniquely adapted to the probabilistic nature of the benefit and the balancing
exercise involved. Owing to the entirely probabilistic nature of the prospect
that is being protected, the tort identifies the boundaries of that prospect ex
post, in an effort to produce an extremely nascent form of a property-like
interest (in the prospect).27 It then protects this interest with due caution
against overreach by focusing primarily on the defendant’s behavior and its
actual and potential effects on the prospect through the highly tailored
individual elements of the action.28
Reduced to its core, copyright law operates in an almost identical fashion,
and for similar reasons. Like tortious interference with a prospect, it protects
a zone of probabilistic benefits—the market for a work of expression—by
assigning it to the author/plaintiff. Instead of just treating the work as the
object of a property interest, copyright law focuses on protecting the prospect
through an elaborate focus on the nature of the defendant’s actions that
interfere with the realization of the prospect. Copyright law has thus never
treated all uses of the protected work as actionable.29 This focus on the
prospective benefit (rather than the work as property) is captured in the
highly specified forms of behavior (i.e., reproduction, distribution,
performance, etc.) that define the extent of each of copyright law’s rights, the
elaborate apparatus that constitutes its infringement analysis, and the
24 Id. § 641 (“The Restatement, with explicit agreement of some courts, protects any kind of
reasonable economic expectancy against intentional and improper interference, so long as the
plaintiff can prove a reasonable probability that the opportunity would have been realized but for
the defendant’s intentional and improper interference . . . .”).
25 Id. § 640.
26 Id.
27 For discussions of this property interest, see generally Benjamin L. Fine, Comment, An
Analysis of the Formation of Property Rights Underlying Tortious Interference with Contracts and Other
Economic Relations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1116 (1983); Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual
Relations in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1510 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Tortious Interference].
28 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
29 Indeed, this is a bedrock principle of copyright law that was confirmed by the Supreme
Court in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S 99, 102 (1879).
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considerations that motivate its balancing exercise under the rubric of fair
use. In short, each of the common law’s analytical components that are seen
in tortious interference with a prospect finds strong correspondence in
accepted copyright doctrine.
Perhaps most importantly though, the similarity is more than just of pure
analytical value. It contains lessons for several of copyright’s enduring
doctrinal puzzles, which it recasts as embodiments of tortious interference
with a prospect, and offers lessons for their resolution. First, it suggests that
the true object of protection for modern copyright law—at least in the U.S.—
is neither the “work” nor the “author,” as has been commonly assumed. It is
instead the prospective market for the work, a probabilistic entitlement that
the system should be more willing to contextually tailor and define. Second,
it reveals that copyright law’s bifurcation of “copying” into factual and
normative components can be streamlined once the overall basis of liability
is rationalized through the idea of copying. Third, it shows that “copying,”
central to copyright’s liability calculus, does indeed embody an element of
advertence/volition, which does not detract from the structure of copyright
infringement as a strict liability tort. And fourth, it identifies how copyright
law can avoid the needless redundancy between fair use and elements of the
infringement analysis.
The homological account of copyright and tortious interference with a
prospect developed in this Article is both descriptive and normative. On the
one hand, the strong symmetry between the conceptual structure of copyright
and tortious interference with a prospect suggests underappreciated insights
into the working of copyright doctrine. At the same time, it also highlights
how those very mechanisms might themselves be reshaped to give effect to
ideals and values that are common to both. The theory offered herein is
therefore interpretive.30
Besides suggesting modifications to copyright doctrine, the homology
between copyright and tortious interference with a prospect also brings out
important lessons for copyright theorizing and lawmaking. It helps makes
sense of copyright’s dominant theory of creator incentives, according to which
copyright’s primary purpose is to “supply” creators with an incentive to
create.31 The homology reveals this to be only partially true, and that
copyright’s real function lies in protecting rather than supplying creators’ market
incentives. The homology also pushes in the direction of thinking about
copyright as a framework of liability, rather than entitlement, which is more
than just of semantic significance. Lastly, it strongly recommends a more
For a general account of interpretive theory, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 464 (1986).
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (noting that
“copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas” (emphasis added)).
30
31
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active role for courts in shaping the copyright entitlement, thereby
contributing to copyright law and policy by engaging the discourse of
copyright’s normative goals more directly.
Part I of the Article begins with an analytical overview of tortious
interference with a prospective economic advantage. It traces the general
development of the action as a subsidiary to the inducement of breach action
(I.A.); describes the manner in which it has evolved as a distinctive action
(I.B.); and then sets out some of the normative criteria that motivate courts’
application and development of the tort (I.C.). Part II highlights the
homology between copyright and tortious interference and unpacks the
content of copyright’s entitlement and liability structures through the action
of tortious interference with a prospect. It develops the idea of a homological
theory as an interpretive exercise and sets out its core tenets (II.A); argues
that copyright and tortious interference deserve to be understood as a
homology owing to a common plurality of normative motivations underlying
both regimes (II.B); and shows how copyright’s fundamental doctrinal
puzzles may be fruitfully understood through the working of tortious
interference doctrine (II.C). Part III examines the broader implications that
flow from the homology and focuses on three: justificatory (III.A); analytical
(III.B); and institutional (III.C).
I. THE FORGOTTEN TORT ACTION: INTERFERENCE
WITH A PROSPECT
Despite having a long pedigree of their own, intentional torts—wrongs
committed through a defendant’s intentional actions—have come to receive
significantly less scholarly attention than have their fault-based
counterparts (i.e., negligence).32 Even within the category of intentional
torts, those focusing on harms to person and property, such as assault and
trespass, tend to dominate the discussion. Given this landscape, tortious
interference with a prospective economic advantage is all but ignored in any
serious discussion about tort law and comparisons thereto. In addition to
this benign neglect, tortious interference with a prospect also suffers from
the problem of being overshadowed by its sister action of intentional
interference with a contract (also known as inducement to breach a
32 See, e.g., David Howarth, Is There a Future for Intentional Torts?, in THE CLASSIFICATION
OF OBLIGATIONS 233, 266 (Peter Birks ed. 1997); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127, 127 (1981) (“‘Intent’ is not a

normal part of the economist’s vocabulary . . . . [P]erhaps this is why there is so little writing on
intentional torts as such.”); Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2006) (noting how there is “much more complexity to the structure of
intentional tort doctrine than we typically assume”).
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contract), which has received significantly more attention over the years.
While similar in their broad structure, the two actions are distinct in many
important analytical and normative respects.33 This Part provides an
overview of tortious interference with a prospect. Section I.A describes the
origins and development of tortious interference with a contract, the
original tortious interference claim; Section I.B. then focuses on the
distinctiveness of interference with a prospect from a doctrinal perspective;
and Section I.C examines the theoretical considerations motivating the
construction and application of tortious interference with a prospect.
A. Tortious Interference in General
Of the various torts that fall under the generic category of “tortious
interference,” tortious interference with a contract, otherwise known as
intentional inducement of breach, remains the best known and most
commonly invoked. Its prominence within the broader category is also
reflective of the manner in which the category evolved as a whole. Some
scholars trace the roots of the claim back to Roman law, which allowed a
master to recover from a third party for behavior that interfered with the
ability of a servant to perform his duties to the master.34 Early English law
adopted the Roman law claim into the common law, and in addition came to
introduce an independent statutory claim for “procurement” or
“enticement.”35 These were distinct situations where a third party had
succeeded in luring a servant away from his or her master.36 This position
continued until the mid-nineteenth century, when the tortious interference
action received its clearest common law formulation in the now-celebrated
case of Lumley v. Gye.37
The case arose out of a situation where a prominent opera singer, Johanna
Wagner, had contracted to sing exclusively at the plaintiff ’s theatre for three
months.38 The defendant, who operated a competing theatre, persuaded
Wagner to break her contract with the plaintiff and to perform at his theatre
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, §638.
See Francis Bowes Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 663-66 (1923)
(describing the tradition of the paterfamilias bringing on action when a servant is injured and loss of
services is suffered).
35 Id. at 664-65; see also Note, Tortious Interference, supra note 27, at 1514-15 (1980) (“The law
strengthened a master’s control over his servants by preventing others from interfering with the
relationship during the term of service.”).
36 See Sayre, supra note 34, at 665-66 (“This enactment did not wipe away the preexisting
common law action for injuring another’s servants through violence; it created an additional
statutory remedy for enticing another’s servants with features quite distinct from those of the
common law action.”).
37 Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.).
38 Id. at 752.
33
34
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instead.39 While the plaintiff commenced an action against Wagner for breach
of contract, he independently brought an action against the defendant for
inducing the breach of his contract with Wagner.40 In addressing this claim,
the court chose to expand the action for enticement into a more general
principle and ultimately found for the plaintiff, noting that it was “clear law
that a person who wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same thing,
with notice, interrupts the relation subsisting between master and servant by
procuring the servant to depart from the master’s service . . . commits a
wrongful act for which he is responsible at law.”41 The formal structure of a
master–servant relationship was hardly essential to the court’s formulation,
and it went on to conclude that there was “no reason for confining the case to
services or engagements under contracts for services of any particular
description” and that it “may well apply to all cases where there is an unlawful
and malicious enticing away of any person employed to give his personal
labour or service for a given time under the direction of a master or employer
who is injured by the wrongful act.”42
In the end, the court based its decision on the fact that the plaintiff had
acted “maliciously” under the facts of the case.43 Yet, in principle some of the
judges in the case appeared perfectly willing to equate malice with actual
notice of the underlying contract. Thus emerged the action of tortious
interference with a contract as a formal and independent claim at common
law. A few decades later, the case of Bowen v. Hall affirmed the principle
developed in Lumley, converting it into a recognized doctrine of the common
law.44 Adding content to the elements, the court in Bowen further noted that
not all attempts to persuade a party to breach its contract were actionable as
such. “[I]f the persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of injuring the
plaintiff, or of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff,” only
then is it “a malicious act which is in law and in fact a wrong act, and therefore
a wrongful act, and therefore an actionable act if injury ensues from it.”45
Shortly thereafter, the case of Temperton v. Russell expanded the reach of the
action to encompass any type or category of contract, while affirming the
prior courts’ conception of malice.46

Id.
This action became a celebrated contract law case in its own right. Lumley v. Wagner (1852)
64 Eng. Rep. 1209 (Ch. Div.).
41 Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. at 752-53.
42 Id. at 753.
43 Id. at 755.
44 Bowen v. Hall, (1881) 6 QBD 333, 339 (Eng.).
45 Id. at 337.
46 Temperton v. Russell (No. 2), (1893) 1 Q.B. 715, 727-28 (Eng.) (finding the limitation of the
principle to personal service contracts to be untenable).
39
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It wasn’t long before the case and its progeny received significant attention
among American courts and scholars.47 The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the
doctrine in 1894, with a majority of states doing the same shortly before.48 As
this occurred, however, courts applying the doctrine came to imbue it with an
important modification. The element of “malicious” behavior came to be
stripped of its independent analytical significance. As long as a defendant was
shown to have known of the preexisting contract and to have acted in an
intentional manner thereafter to procure its breach, the action was deemed
satisfied.49 Additionally, the defendant’s market-driven motivations underlying
the inducement were also treated as largely irrelevant.50
These developments caused one early commentator to lament that
American courts had converted the doctrine “into a sweeping generalization,
applicable to every case where a third party through his conduct causes the
breach of a known contract.”51 Yet, in some ways this was hardly a mere
47 For early scholarly attention, see James Barr Ames, Purchaser for Value Without Notice, 1
HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1887) (citing Lumley to explain the tort of destroying the property for an
obligee); Ernst Freund, Malicious and Unlawful Interference, 11 HARV. L. REV. 449, 451 (1898)
(explaining how Lumley applies the theory of the right to employ labor “free from undue
interference”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1894)
(explaining that Lumley and its progeny “simply establish the principle that a contractual obligation
operates not merely upon the person bound to performance, but upon every one else, insofar as he
must not procure a breach of that obligation . . . .”); Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Brief Survey
of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARV. L. REV. 55, 57 (1887) (discussing the idea that “a right created by a
personal obligation can be violated by an act which constitutes a tort”); William Schofield, The
Principle of Lumley v. Gye, and Its Application, 2 HARV. L. REV. 19, 23 (1888). Lumley was cited for
the first time in an argument before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1855. See Ela v.
Smith, 71 Mass. 121, 129 (1855) (discussing the liability of defendants if they had aided others in
unlawful acts). For the earliest American case law taking notice of the development, see Chambers
& Marshall v. Baldwin, 1889 WL 1256, at *1 (Ky. Super. May 8, 1889), arguing the dictum of Lumley
extended the case’s principles. See also Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 565 (1871) (expressing some
doubt about the doctrine); Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225, 240 (1883) (discussing limitations in the
doctrine’s application); Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 1880 WL 10954, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1880) (showing that enticement action is not strictly based on a master-servant relationship); Duffies
v. Duffies, 45 N.W. 522, 523 (Wis. 1890) (using Lumley as an example of the many relationships to
which the doctrine applies).
48 See Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Omaha Ry. Co., 151 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1894) (“It
has been repeatedly held that, if one maliciously interferes in a contract between two parties, and
induced one of them to break that contract to the injury of the other, the party injured can maintain
an action against the wrongdoer . . . .”); see also Note, Lumley v. Gye in the Supreme Court, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 425, 428 (1894) (noting that “Mr. Justice Brewer . . . adopts the principle of Lumley v. Gye”).
49 See, e.g., Beekman v. Marsters, 80 N.E. 817, 819 (Mass. 1907) (“[If] the defendant [knew] of
the contract between the plaintiff and the hotel corporation [and] intentionally and without
justification induced the hotel corporation to break [the contract] . . . . [t]hat is proof of malice
. . . .”). For a criticism of the case, see Sayre, supra note 34, at 676-77.
50 See, e.g., Beekman, 80 N.E. at 818 (“No case has been cited which holds that a right to compete
justifies a defendant in intentionally inducing a third person to take away from the plaintiff his
contractual rights.”).
51 Sayre, supra note 34, at 677.
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product of American lawmaking. As previously discussed, the court in Lumley
had itself equated malice with notice of the contract.52 Later courts signed on
to the idea that a benefit (to the defendant) coupled with a detriment (to the
plaintiff) also evidenced such malice, a structure that was common to just
about any knowing breach.53 Rhetoric aside, malice therefore does not appear
to have been a consciously designed constraint during the early framing of
the doctrine. American courts and scholars interpreting the malice
requirement came to understand it as connoting the absence of a justification
or privilege for the defendant’s behavior and nothing more.54 The idea of
malice as ill will or bad motive never quite took off. As long as a defendant
knew that the act was likely to result in a breach, and did in fact produce such
a breach, the element was deemed satisfied.
As should be apparent, the gradual crystallization of the doctrine around
an identifiable interest of the plaintiff (contractual performance), and a
concurrent expansion of the defendant’s behavior that might trigger liability,
in effect created a property-like interest in the claimant.55 In other words,
the tort had the direct effect of converting an in personam contractual
relationship (that existed between the parties to the contract) into a broader
in rem obligation against anyone with knowledge of the contract. That
obligation was of course—unlike regular property—limited to not inducing
a breach of the contract. Yet, it crystallized the propertization of the
contractual obligation. Indeed, this point was brought home most forcefully
in one court’s explicit observation that the doctrine allowed a contract to
Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 752-53 (Q.B.).
See, e.g., Bowen v. Hall, (1881) 6 QBD 333, 338 (Eng.); see also Note, Tortious Interference,
supra note 27, at 1527 (“Since virtually all interference works to the benefit of the third party and the
detriment of the plaintiff, this definition of malice enabled courts to impose liability in almost any
case of inducement.”).
54 See Carpenter, supra note 21, at 735 (1928) (“Malice in the sense of bad motive is not a
requisite of the prima facie tort.”); see also Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 87 A. 927, 931
(Md. 1913), aff ’d, 237 U.S. 447 (1915) (“Malice in this form of action does not mean actual malice, or
ill will, but consists in the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal justification or excuse.”).
But see Sayre, supra note 34, at 675 (“‘Malice’ connotes a mental element.”).
55 See Carpenter, supra note 21, at 732 (“The promisee’s interest . . . is to have performance of
the contract. He has also an interest as respects third persons in having the contract right which he
has against the promisor free from invasions by third persons which may either prevent, retard, or
lessen the value of its performance.”); Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual
Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV. 335, 351 (1980) (“[T]he interference torts courts have recognized a
kind of property right in contracts, because the contract, which begins as an agreement between two
persons has somehow come to bind persons who were not parties to it and do not benefit from it.”);
Fine, supra note 27, at 1118 (“[A] party expecting to enter into a contract has a property right . . . .”);
Note, Tortious Interference, supra note 27, at 1524 (noting that under the doctrine, “breach of a
contractual promise is a violation of property rights”). Even some early courts characterized it as
such. See, e.g., Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 53 A. 230, 232 (N.J. Ch. 1902) (“That the interest
of an employer or an employ[ee] in a contract for services is property is conceded.”).
52
53
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“impose[] on all the world the duty of respecting that contractual
obligation.”56 Tortious interference with a contract thus created a framework
of exclusion—from the underlying contractual obligation—through a regime
of liability—an analytical structure that has been described elsewhere as a
form of “quasi-property.”57
In the tort’s development during the first quarter of the twentieth century,
primary reliance on the formal elements of the claim proved to be inadequate,
as courts and scholars became increasingly aware that doctrinal rules
themselves were indeterminate and driven by normative criteria.58 What soon
emerged in place of a mechanistic application of the elements was recognition
that a claimant’s property (or property-like) interest needed to be balanced
against the market-driven interests of defendants, and of society (in free
competition) more generally.59 This, in turn, produced an emphasis on
“balancing” competing considerations. One leading commentator thus
proposed a general approach in the following terms:
Whether a privilege of invasion exists depends on whether it is of greater
moment to society to protect the defendant in the invading activities than it
is to protect and guard the plaintiff ’s interest from such invasions. An
evaluation and balancing of the social import of the conflicting interests of
the respective parties and of the social interests per se are involved. The
defendant may be privileged to invade an interest of the plaintiff although it
is not for the protection or furtherance . . . of a social interest of greater
public import than is the social interest involved in the protection of the
plaintiff ’s individual interest.60

Balancing entailed examining both social and individual interests on both
sides of the claim. In due course, courts developed a fairly rich jurisprudence
of privileges and defenses that justified defendants’ actions and exempted
them from a claim of tortious interference.61

Temperton v Russell (No.2), (1893) 1 Q.B. 715, 730 (Eng.).
See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, But Not Quite Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1889, 1889-93 (2012) (discussing the contours of quasi-property and its reliance on relational
liability); Dobbs, supra note 55, at 373.
58 See Note, Tortious Interference, supra note 27, at 1537 (“Formal reasoning could not resolve the
dilemma, nor could blind appeal to conclusory doctrines such as malice.”). For an overview of this general
current in legal thinking, manifested in the idea of Legal Realism, see generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA,
BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2009).
59 See Note, Tortious Interference, supra note 27, at 1537-38 (describing the two strategies that
emerged to resolve this problem: new rules that “qualified both parties’ rights and privileges” and
new attempts to balance competing interests).
60 Carpenter, supra note 21, at 745.
61 For a useful summary of this jurisprudence, see id. at 745-62.
56
57
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This general approach—of balancing competing considerations—
continued through the 1970s, and culminated in a specific provision in the
Second Restatement of Torts, which set out the various considerations that
courts had come to employ as part of this process.62 The commentary
accompanying the provision highlights the ambiguity accompanying the
exercise and notes the reality that the ultimate decision “depends upon a
judgment and choice of values in each situation.”63 The Restatement
suggested liability only when the interference was both intentional and
improper, with the impropriety in turn depending on balancing competing
considerations.64 The interference with contract tort is intriguing because it
enables courts to examine and balance competing normative considerations
directly, and on an individual case-by-case basis. Rather than require that the
balancing take place behind an abstract conceptual device, the mid-twentieth
century evolution of the doctrine enabled the idea of the parties’ interests to
be laid out directly during the litigation. This in turn required courts to
confront their own roles as adjudicators not just of formal claims/criteria, but
of the relative and situational importance of the competing considerations at
stake. This approach continues to this day. A leading treatise on American
tort law describes the balancing approach that courts developed as the “good
sense” approach.65
As understood today, tortious interference with a contract embodies six
key elements:66
First, there must be a valid contract in existence.
Second, the defendant must have known of the contract’s existence before
its breach, since without which the intentionality question becomes moot.
The defendant need not have known the specifics of the contract (i.e., its
individual provisions). Therefore, circumstantial evidence of knowledge is
usually sufficient.67
Third, the interference must be intentional. Courts have interpreted this
requirement to mean either the existence of a specific purpose—to interfere—
on the part of the defendant, or instead the defendant’s knowledge that the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
Id. at § 767 cmt. b.
See id. at § 766 (“One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person
not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the
other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.” (emphasis added)).
65 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 618 (“Most courts still decide what is an improper means
or improper purpose in the way English courts did in the 19th century—by simply applying what
the judge thinks is ‘good sense.’”).
66 Id. § 619.
67 See id. § 621 (detailing how intent and knowledge are to be proven).
62
63
64
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interference was a “substantial certainty.”68 In practice, the intentionality
requirement is hardly an onerous one.
Fourth, the defendant must have had an “improper motive” or used
“improper means.”69 In recent years, courts appear to be moving to the latter
of these alternatives, and abandoning the former, which relies on an earlier
conception of malice.70
Fifth, the defendant’s interference must have caused the breach; it should
not have occurred for reasons unconnected to the interference.71
And sixth, the breach must cause the plaintiff some harm or detriment.72
Of the six elements seen in the modern formulation of the tort, the
element of “improper means” is perhaps the hardest to satisfy in practice,
given its slipperiness. Acts that are independently criminal or tortious form
only one part of the category of improper means.73 Beyond crimes and
actionable wrongs, breaches of accepted ethical and professional standards
and other forms of behavior that independently (of the interference claim)
invite an element of disapprobation seem to qualify as well.74 Despite the
claim having expanded to now cover a variety of different contractual
situations and a diverse set of defendant behaviors, it is crucial to emphasize
that it has yet to simplistically treat the act of “interference” as independently
wrongful.75 Only when the interference is shown to be wrongful as an
independent matter—either owing to the interests/rights involved, the
defendant’s motives, or the independent impropriety of the actions as such—
does liability attach. Thus, while liability under the tort has grown, it has done
so with close consideration of the normative issues at stake, a lesson that is
important for copyright law.
B. The Distinctiveness of the Action for a “Prospect”
As the previous discussion reveals, tortious interference with a contract
effectively generates a property-like entitlement around the contractual
benefit that is meant to accrue to the contracting parties as a legal matter.

Id.
Id. §§ 622-629.
See id. § 623 (describing a third—and most recent—stage in the development of this prong
among courts wherein liability is based on the defendant’s “use of tortious or otherwise improper
means of interference”).
71 Id. § 619.
72 Id.
73 Id. §§ 627-29.
74 Id. § 627.
75 See Dobbs, supra note 55, at 344 (observing that “[t]o find a wrong in interference we shall
have to add some factor besides the act of interfering by persuasion or honest representation” and
arguing that “[we] should therefore put aside any notion that interference is in its nature ‘wrong’”).
68
69
70
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Given that the law guarantees either contractual performance or its monetary
equivalent to the contracting parties, tortious interference with a contract
treats the de jure guarantee of an economically valuable benefit as worthy of
independent protection through a regime of liability.
The basis of the entitlement in tortious interference with a contract
therefore originates in the central premise of contract law, according to which
a legally enforceable agreement guarantees the contracting party some
measure of benefit.76 Conversely, when a contract does not exist between the
parties, the law obviously can no longer guarantee the accrual of some benefit.
Nonetheless, there are numerous situations where a similar economic benefit
is seen as probabilistically very likely, and therefore worthy of similar
protection against improper interferences, even if not certain. It is to protect
such situations, i.e., where the economic benefit is less than certain but
nevertheless highly likely to accrue to a party, that tortious interference with
a prospect developed as a distinctive claim.
The origins of tortious interference with a prospect can be traced back to
the case of Temperton v. Russell,77 an English case decided shortly after Lumley,
wherein the court confirmed the logic of tortious interference but appeared
willing to extend it further. The court there observed:
The next point is, whether the distinction taken for the defendants between
the claim for inducing persons to break contracts already entered into with
the plaintiff and that for inducing persons not to enter into contracts with
the plaintiff can be sustained, and whether the latter claim is maintainable in
law. I do not think that distinction can prevail. There was the same wrongful
intent in both cases, wrongful because malicious. There was the same kind of
injury to the plaintiff. It seems rather a fine distinction to say that, where a
defendant maliciously induces a person not to carry out a contract already
made with the plaintiff and so injures the plaintiff, it is actionable, but where
he injures the plaintiff by maliciously preventing a person from entering into
a contract with the plaintiff, which he would otherwise have entered into, it
is not actionable.78

In short, the court in Temperton saw (a) an interference with a valid
contractual benefit, and (b) an interference with a benefit that was likely to
culminate in a contractual arrangement, as largely equivalent. In one respect, the
court’s logic is persuasive: the mere formalization of a benefit through a contract
76 Indeed, the very definition of a contract says as much, in understanding a contract as an
agreement enforceable at law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy,
or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”).
77 [1893] 1 Q.B. 715 (Eng.).
78 Id. at 728.
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does little to transform its substantive basis. Preventing a contract from being
formed and preventing a contractual performance from happening once the
contract is indeed formed, both produce identical harm to the claimant. Yet from
another perspective, the distinction is analytically significant.
Whereas in the one (i.e. the contract), contract law’s guarantee of a benefit
to the claimant underwrites the basis for the entitlement that tort law then
protects through a property-like regime; in the latter, that guarantee must be
derived independently from the facts surrounding the parties’ interactions.
In other words, determining whether the plaintiff had an interest that was
itself worthy of protection from an interference—however improper or
intentional the interference might have been—emerges as an important first
step in the inquiry. This is unlike in the contractual setting, where the claim
effectively outsources this step to contract law.
While the action for tortious interference with a prospect is today
commonly thought of as a derivative of tortious interference with a contract,
some trace its origins back to the fifteenth century, and the common law’s
development of actions for threatening a business’s profits with “mayhem and
vex.”79 In its origins, the tort action therefore developed as a claim for unfair
competition, designed to police the line between permissible and
impermissible market-behavior.80 The action was in turn built on the
recognition that in a competitive setting, one party always loses regardless of
the legality of the other’s behavior. Mere harm/loss was therefore insufficient
to trigger liability; something more was always needed. With the decision in
Lumley and its expansion in Temperton, courts appear to have infused the
common law’s understanding of tortious interference with considerations
drawn from the early cases on unfair competition.81
Tortious interference with a prospect does not appear to have gained
much acceptance in the United States until the middle of the twentieth
century, when a few state courts began recognizing the action.82 It was not
until the 1970s that courts across the country began grappling with the
contours of the tort, with some jurisdictions (e.g., California) adopting a
more liberal approach to the tort, while others (e.g., New York) continuing to
limit its scope and reach for fear of expanding liability to cover otherwise
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
Some see this line of reasoning to correspond to some of the early landmark unfair
competition cases. See id. (“In all of these cases liability was imposed for interference with business
expectancies . . . but in all of them the actor’s conduct was characterized by violence, fraud, or
defamation, and was tortious in character.”).
81 Id.
82 See, e.g., Masoni v. Bd. of Trade of San Francisco, 260 P.2d 205, 207 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1953) (“Actionable interference of this kind is not limited to inducing breach of an existing contract
or other wrongful conduct but comprises also unjustifiably inducing a third person not to enter into
or continue a business relation with another.”).
79
80
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legitimate behavior.83 During this development, the action also took on
different names—”interference with a business relation,” “interference with
an economic opportunity,” or “interference with a prospective advantage”—
within different jurisdictions even though they encompassed the same
claim.84 As applied today, the action has four elements: (i) the defendant must
have known of the plaintiff ’s economic prospect and intended to interfere
with it; (ii) the prospect must have been reasonably likely to be realized and
not merely speculative; (iii) the interference must have been by improper
means or with an improper motive; and (iv) the interference must have
caused some harm to the plaintiff.85
The first and fourth elements of the action are largely similar to tortious
interference with a contract. Knowledge of a prospect, coupled with the
substantial certainty that it will be interfered with, is sufficient to satisfy the
elements of knowledge and intention. Additionally, the harm at issue is
clearly economic harm. The real divergence arises in the second and third
elements (i.e., in defining the prospect), and in characterizing the defendant’s
behavior as wrongful. As should be apparent, these questions are not wholly
unconnected to the first and fourth elements and exert a good deal of
influence over them.
On the question of a qualifying “prospect” and defendant wrongdoing,
case law appears to reveal an inverse correlation.86 The more certain a
prospect is, the lesser is the proof of defendant wrongdoing that the law
insists on. An actual contract is thus the most certain of all prospects, an
executory contract or invalid agreement slightly less certain, and so on. As
the certainty of the prospect diminishes, courts demand heightened proof of
actual defendant wrongdoing for liability to attach. Or, as one treatise puts
it, the defendant has far greater privilege to interfere with opportunities than
it would with an “existing and enforceable contract.”87
This inverse correlation is important to appreciate, because it gives the
“right” underlying the working of the tort a distinctively relational
83 See, e.g., Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 871 (Cal. 1975) (“First of all, the tort is
considerably more inclusive than actions based on contract or interference with contract, and thus
is not dependent on the existence of a valid contract.”); Gold v. L.A. Democratic League, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 732, 739 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (“An action lies for intentional interference with advantages
which are merely prospective; such an action is governed by the principles applicable to the tort of
inducing a breach of contract intentionally and without justification.”); Guard-Life Corp. v. S.
Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445, 449 (N.Y. 1980) (“[G]reater protection is accorded
an interest in an existing contract . . . than to the less substantive, more speculative interests in a
prospective relationship . . . .”).
84 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 638.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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dimension.88 Determining whether an action is potentially proscribed is
dependent on the very nature of the interest involved and vice versa,
requiring an understanding of the probabilistic and contingent nature of both
ideas. To the extent that the tort recognizes a right in an economic prospect
or opportunity, the nature of that right (and its violation) is itself dependent
on the defendant’s actions and consequences.
1. Identifying a Protectable Opportunity
The first, and perhaps most important, step in establishing a claim for
tortious interference with a prospect lies in identifying a protectable
opportunity that qualifies as a prospect which the plaintiff is entitled to. Not
surprisingly, courts have spent much time and effort trying to delineate a
protectable opportunity for the tort.
As a preliminary, courts insist that the prospect must be something more
than a “mere hope.”89 It must instead be a “reasonable” as opposed to merely
“subjective” expectancy.90 This distinction is hard to capture in the abstract,
but appears to eliminate situations where the underlying facts, which form
the basis of the expectation, are legally or factually incompatible with the
expectancy. Thus, an at-will employee’s hope of long-term employment when
the existing employment contract clearly suggests otherwise, would remain a
subjective—and unreasonable—expectancy.91 Similarly, courts also insist that
the prospect be one that was likely to have accrued to the plaintiff “but for”
the defendant’s intervention.92 This conception appears more stringent than
the reasonable–subjective distinction insofar as it demands proof of an actual
benefit likely to accrue. It would therefore exclude situations where a plaintiff
was precluded from placing a bid, and yet the bid—even if placed—would
have likely lost out to other offers.93 In all of these situations, courts place
88 For an elaborate theoretical account of this relational idea, see generally Gideon
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L. REV. 1313 (2012).
89 Glenn v. Point Park Coll., 272 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa. 1971); see also Ethan Allen, Inc. v.
Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So. 2d 812, 815 (Fla. 1994) (“The mere hope that some of its past
customers may choose to buy again cannot be basis for a tortious interference claim.”); Gieseke ex
rel. Diversified Water Diversion, Inc. v. IDCA, Inc., 844 N.W.2d 210, 222 (Minn. 2014) (“This must
be something more than a mere hope or innate optimism of the salesman.”); United Educ. Distribs.,
LLC v. Educ. Testing Serv., 564 S.E.2d 324, 329 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002).
90 Stehno v. Spring Spectrum, 186 S.W.3d 247, 250 (Mo. 2006).
91 Id.
92 See, e.g., Santana Prods., Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 401 F.3d 123, 140 (3d Cir.
2005) (discussing plaintiff ’s argument that plaintiff “would have obtained the contract but for the
defendant’s marketing campaign”); Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1015 (3d
Cir. 1994) (failing to show that plaintiffs would have entered into the contracts but for defendants’
interference).
93 Santana, 401 F.3d at 140-41 (“However, even if [plaintiff] had had the opportunity to bid,
one of the other two suppliers . . . could still have obtained the contract.”).
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great emphasis on the background and surrounding factual circumstances
before presuming the existence of a prospect.
Despite these somewhat stringent tests, in practice courts appear quite
willing to find the existence of a prospect in a variety of situations. Indeed,
one treatise notes the existence of a disconnect between courts’ abstract
rhetoric about the identification of a prospect and their actual use of the
factual record to then find a prospect in ways that contradict their abstract
statements.94 While some courts therefore appear to insist (in the abstract)
that the action is only available against specific or identifiable “relationships”,
these restrictive interpretations might be interpreted as little more than
“overstatements” of courts’ search for a causal connection between the
interference and the lost opportunity. 95
Of the various jurisdictions that continue to endorse the tort, California
appears to have the most advanced jurisprudence. California courts have
developed a process for identifying a protectable prospect that balances both
analytical and pragmatic considerations. They insist on the plaintiff
establishing a “reasonable probability” and a counterfactual causal
relationship between the interference and the benefit to the plaintiff.96 All
the same, to identify a reasonable probability, they look to how much “chance”
is involved in the actual accrual of the benefit. In making this assessment,
they rely on William Prosser’s admonition that the prospect usually reflects a
“background of business experience on the basis of which it is possible to
estimate with some fair amount of success both the value of what has been
lost and the likelihood that the plaintiff would have received it if the
defendant had not interfered.”97
The case of Youst v. Longo,98 decided by the Supreme Court of California,
is a good example of courts’ approach to identifying a protectable prospect.
The plaintiff was a racehorse owner who brought an action for intentional
interference with a prospective economic advantage against the defendant,
the rider of a competing racehorse.99 The plaintiff alleged that as a result of
the defendant’s actions during the race (of striking the plaintiff ’s horse), he

94 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 641 (“[C]ourts sometimes state the constraining rule and
then later in the same opinion re-state it to eliminate its bite, undermining any confidence that the
original statement was purposeful and exclusive.”).
95 Id. § 641 & nn. 7-9 (making this point and citing to cases from different jurisdictions). In
an alternative reading, these restrictions in courts’ rhetoric may be seen as meaningful.
96 James V. Telfer, Comment, Interference with Prospective Gain: Must there be a Contract?,
22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 408 (1985).
97 W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1006 (W. Page Keeton
et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
98 729 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1987).
99 Id. at 730-31.
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was prevented from winning a larger cash prize than he actually did.100 The
cash prize was thus the prospect that the plaintiff claimed an entitlement to;
the defendant’s intentional actions were alleged to have improperly interfered
with this prospect. Central to the court’s analysis was its recognition that the
prize at issue was a mere contest, a “speculative expectanc[y].”101 The Court
went on to observe:
Determining the probable expectancy of winning a sporting contest but for
the defendant’s interference seems impossible in most if not all cases,
including the instant case. Sports generally involve the application of various
unique or unpredictable skills and techniques, together with instances of luck
or chance occurring at different times during the event, any one of which
factors can drastically change the event’s outcome. In fact, certain intentional
acts of interference by various potential “defendant” players may, through
imposition of penalties or increased motivation, actually allow the “victim”
player or team to prevail. Usually, it is impossible to predict the outcome of
most sporting events without awaiting the actual conclusion.102

A sporting contest was thus held to be of too low probability to merit
protection.
Equally important in the Court’s conclusion was its recognition that
unlike in some other speculative situations, there was also no independent
public policy reason to allow protection for probable expectancies in sporting
contests. The Court thus left in place protection under the tort for other kinds
of chance-based expectancies, such as a recovery against a defendant who lost
(or destroyed) the evidence that a plaintiff needed in order to bring a personal
injury claim for an accident.103 The interest in a “prospective civil action” was
thought to overcome the lack of certainty underlying the entitlement (to
actual damages in the litigation).104 Similarly, it also left undisturbed a prior
case that allowed recovery from a defendant who had caused the plaintiff to
lose an election by sending out false information about the latter.105 Even
though the plaintiff lost the election by a large margin, the court in the case
had held that the recovery was permitted since the uncertainty in the
entitlement (to the office) was overcome by the importance of communicating
accurate information to the public during an election.106
Id. at 731.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 735. The case was Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
Youst, 729 P.2d at 734. The case was Gold v. L.A. Democratic League, 122 Cal. Rptr. 732 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1975).
106 Youst, 729 P.2d at 734.
100
101
102
103
104
105
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All of this points to three general rules that seem to be at play in courts’
approach to identifying a protectable entitlement under the tort. First, and
unequivocally, uncertain expectancies are treated as unprotectable. These are
typically situations where the element of chance or luck is central to the very
realization of the benefit, or where the benefit is heavily dependent on the
actions of other participants, which are in turn unpredictable. A gamble, lottery,
or sporting chance represents just this kind of uncertainty, where the realization
of the prize is far too probabilistic. To speak of an actual expectancy here—as
opposed to a mere hope of a windfall—is seen as illogical. Second, while chance
recoveries are excluded, the benefit does not need to be absolutely certain.
Courts allow for probabilistic recoveries to be included under the idea of a
benefit, as long as the probabilities are either under the control of the claimant,
or discernible as a regular occurrence based on business experience. Third, and
most importantly, courts appear willing to tolerate lower probabilities in the
entitlement when accompanied by an identifiable public policy supporting the
entitlement. In these situations, the low-probability entitlement is seen as
incentivizing socially beneficial behavior by the plaintiff, rendering it worthy
of independent protection under the tort. The plaintiff’s ability to commence
a personal injury lawsuit represents one such situation.
In summary then, the common law has over the years come to develop a
fairly coherent set of principles with which to distinguish between
speculative chances and probable expectancies. The distinction embodies
both analytical and evaluative components, a duality that is of relevance
when we move to copyright law.
2. Interference as Wrongdoing
Perhaps even more so than with tortious interference with a contract,
claims of tortious interference with a prospect involve the complex balancing
of a defendant’s legitimate interests against the harm sustained by a plaintiff.
The primary area where this nuance manifests itself is in courts’ marked
reluctance to treat all loss-producing interferences with a prospect as per se
actionable.107 The law instead pays close attention to differentiating between
the mere result of the defendant’s conduct on the one hand—i.e., the plaintiff ’s
harm—and the means employed in such conduct on the other.

107 Indeed, when viewed in the abstract some have noted that the rules seem to suggest that
“the whole competitive order of American industry is prima facie illegal.” Della Penna v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 745 (Cal. 1995) (quoting Professor Carl Auerbach at the
ALI Proceedings leading to the passage of the Restatement).
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Some early courts emphasized the element of motive in their analysis of
the defendant’s wrongdoing.108 An “improper motive” was thus taken to be
sufficient to find liability.109 In due course, this came to be abandoned, as
courts came to appreciate the difficulty inherent in policing the boundary
between a bad motive (one directed exclusively at harming the plaintiff, with
no corresponding benefit) and a mixed one (one where the harm to a plaintiff
is itself the basis for the defendant’s benefit).110 Consequently, the modern
trend in cases of tortious interference with a prospect is a rejection of liability
based exclusively on the defendant’s motive.111
Courts instead focus on the means employed by a defendant in interfering
with the identified prospective economic advantage. The jurisprudence on
this topic reveals four principal categories of activities that qualify as
actionable under the tort.112
The first is independently unlawful means, which includes behavior that, on
its own—i.e., independent of tortious interference with a prospect—is
actively proscribed by the law’s directives. These directives encompass not
just criminal law prohibitions, but also relational directives that emanate from
tort law.113 Included in this category are “violence, threats or intimidation,
bribery, unfounded litigation, fraud, misrepresentation or deceit, defamation,
duress, undue influence, misuse of insider or confidential information, [and]
. . . breach of a fiduciary relationship.”114 Given that in these situations, a
plaintiff ordinarily has recourse to an alternative claim for the defendant’s
actions; courts often try to ensure that the tortious interference with a
prospect claim is not redundant before allowing the action to proceed.115
The second category encompasses conditionally unlawful means. It covers
behavior by the defendant that is unlawful in the abstract, but is nonetheless

108 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 639 (“At one time judges stood ready to impose tort
liability for ordinary business decisions . . . if a bad motive was perceived.”).
109 Id.
110 For a discussion of this distinction, see id. § 625.
111 See, e.g., Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. ProServ, Inc., 178 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he
tort of interference with business relationships should be confined to cases in which the defendant
employed unlawful means to stiff a competitor.”); Great Escape, Inc. v. Union City Body Co., 791
F.2d 532, 543 (7th Cir. 1986) (requiring that the means used rise to the level of “wrongfulness”);
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Tex. 2001) (requiring that the means be
“independently tortious or unlawful”).
112 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, §§ 627–29.
113 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 94546 (2010) (“[T]orts are a special kind of legal wrong not only because they are injury-inclusive or
realized wrongs but also because they are relational wrongs.”).
114 Duggin v. Adams, 360 S.E.2d 832, 836 (Va. 1987).
115 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 627 (“Where the plaintiff ’s claim falls within the realm of a
specific tort, however, the rules of that tort should ordinarily control and the overlapping claim for
interference with contract should be disregarded as surplusage.”).
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not actionable by the plaintiff. This nonactionability must however be a
consequence of a defect unrelated to the defendant’s conduct (e.g., standing
or the statute of limitations) rather than one going directly to such conduct.116
Thus, a defendant’s fraudulent behavior toward a third party, which interferes
with a plaintiff ’s prospect, might be actionable by the third party—but not
the plaintiff—rendering it conditionally unlawful.117 On the other hand, when
the claim is defeated because a constitutive element of the tort is not satisfied,
this affects the plaintiff ’s claim as well. The same is true of defenses that the
defendant could raise to defeat the claim to a third party.118 Since such a
defense eliminates wrongdoing altogether, the plaintiff cannot continue to
claim that the defendant’s behavior was unlawful.
It is not only unlawful behavior of the defendant that qualifies as
actionable wrongdoing for tortious interference with a prospect. Lawful
behavior too, behavior that the law does not directly proscribe, can qualify
under certain circumstances. The third and fourth categories represent this
reality. The third category is therefore behavior that is lawful but legally
discouraged. It covers behavior that does not give rise to an independent
cause of action but nonetheless is discouraged by the spirit of the law, or
through the law’s additional requirements.119 Making intentionally false
statements represents an example. While a fraudulent misrepresentation
ordinarily vitiates a contract, it is hardly independently actionable when
made to a stranger.120 All the same, few would disagree that it is actively
discouraged by the law.
The fourth category moves farther away from the law and represents
situations that are lawful but unethical. This category is the most nebulous to
police, and usually covers behavior that is inappropriate owing to the
existence of a strong norm or custom to the contrary.121 The source of that
norm then becomes an independent variable that the plaintiff must prove,
something that courts approach with varying degrees of comfort.122
116 See Kraemer v. Harding, 976 P.2d 1160, 1170 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (barring plaintiff ’s claim
because of the statute of limitations). For a clear statement, see Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 n.11 (Or. 1978) (“[I]n a claim of improper interference with plaintiff ’s
contractual relations, it is not necessary to prove all the elements of liability for another tort if those
elements that pertain to the defendant’s conduct are present.”).
117 See Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc., 582 Pd. 2d at 1371 n.11.
118 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 628.
119 Id. § 629 (putting “economic duress,” “undue influence,” and claims for “restitution” in
this category).
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., RTL Distrib., Inc. v. Double S Batteries, Inc., 545 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Iowa Ct. App.
1996) (noting how liability can be “premised on a violation of recognized ethical rules or established
customs or practices in the business community”).
122 For a reluctance to accept this category, see Speakers of Sport, Inc. 178 F.3d at 867 (“[T]he
established standards of a trade or profession in regard to competition, and its ideas of unethical
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In summary then, the element of wrongful “interference” encompasses a
wide range of defendant behavior, beginning with overtly criminal actions to
those that violate various ethical/customary norms. Much of the reason for
this variation derives from the inverse correlation that the law recognizes,
between the certainty underlying the prospective economic opportunity and
the amount of wrongdoing required.
C. Underlying Rationale(s)
Tortious interference with a prospect has received somewhat scarce
normative analysis from scholars ever since its origins. Scholarly analyses
have instead focused principally on inducement of breach (i.e., tortious
interference with a contract), with several of the arguments therein carrying
over well to tortious interference with a prospect.123 A review of this limited
literature as well as courts’ jurisprudence applying the tort, reveals three
interrelated justifications for the action.
1. Economic Justifications: Incentives and Deterrents
One justification attempts to understand tortious interference in
principally economic terms, despite its conflict with the ideal of efficient
breach.124 The best known account of this justification is seen in the work of
Lillian BeVier.125 In her account, the tort functions as a deterrent against free
riding in cases that involve the acquisition or production of contract- (or
prospect-) specific information by a promisee (i.e., the potential plaintiff).126
In numerous commercial situations, one party—the promisee, or the one with
competitive conduct, are likely to reflect a desire to limit competition for reasons related to the selfinterest of the trade or profession rather than to the welfare of its customers or clients.”).
123 See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 23, §§ 638–42; Mark P. Gergen, Tortious Interference: How It Is
Engulfing Commercial Law, Why This Is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudential Response, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
1175, 1177 (1996) (“One of two strands of scholarship on the tort . . . focuses on the case where a stranger
induces someone to breach a clear cut contract obligation.”); Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference
with Contract Versus “Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 132 (1999)
(“[T]he interference tort is an affront to the efficient-breach model.”); Harvey S. Perlman, Interference
with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
61, 64 (1982) (describing how the tort of intentional interference was applied “to a variety of contracts
and . . . to prospective relationships not yet formalized into contract”).
124 For more on this conflict, see Perlman, supra note 123; see also Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading
Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1100
(2000) (noting that “[e]ven if the theory [of efficient breach] were sound, it is clearly wrong to say
that the law does not want to deter efficient breaches”).
125 Lillian R. BeVier, Reconsidering Inducement, 76 VA. L. REV. 877, 886 (1990) (“A second
reason to focus attention on inducement is that the inducement facts starkly pose the apparent
conflict between tort rules that impose liability for contractual interference and contract norms that
celebrate the movement of resources to higher valuing users.”).
126 Id. at 899.
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the potential prospect—invests significantly in the acquisition of information
that is highly specific to that prospect/contract and therefore without acceptable
substitutes.127 As an example of such a scenario, BeVier identifies “a contract to
purchase controlling shares in a corporation.”128 The process involves the
collection and analysis of information specific to that particular corporation.
In such “returns-to-information” cases, liability for intentional
interference with a prospect functions as an ex ante incentive for the
information-gathering party to invest into the collection and production of
information.129 A third party that now seeks to intentionally interfere with
the contract/prospect is in an important sense freeriding on the information
procured by the promisee. BeVier underscores this last point by highlighting
the tort’s emphasis on a defendant’s knowledge of the contract/prospect. If
the third party values the prospect more highly than the investing promisee,
the third party can initiate a transaction with the promisee or invest into the
production of information on its own.130 Yet, by interfering with the
promisee’s prospect, with knowledge of its existence and likely realization,
the third party is clearly seeking to reduce its own costs to realize the same
market outcome as the promisee.131 Tortious liability in these circumstances
discourages freeriding by third parties, renders the information produced
appropriable by the investor, and supports the overall incentive to invest in
the production of information.
This account of tortious interference mimics the logic of some unfair
competition claims, where the unfairness of a defendant’s actions is seen to lie in
its reliance on the prior efforts of a plaintiff–competitor, principally to lower its
own costs.132 The problem with the freeriding in these scenarios is less about the
circumvention of a potential market transaction, and more with the defendant’s
ability to compete on more favorable terms by avoiding the costly investment
made by the plaintiff. It is thus analytically independent of any need to treat the
investment/information as an independent asset (i.e., as an object of ownership).

Id. at 899-900.
Id. at 899.
Id. at 916.
Id. at 919-20.
Id.
As an instance of such an argument, see Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 47,
52 (D. Idaho 1962), where the plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s retransmission of a broadcaster’s
signals was an interference with its own exclusive contract with the broadcaster. The essence of the
plaintiff ’s argument was that the defendant—by avoiding the payment of a license fee to the
broadcaster—was competing unfairly owing to its own lower costs. The district court allowed the
tortious interference claim, and expressly equated it with an unfair competition cause. Id. at 58
(“[T]he same result has been accomplished upon grounds of unfair competition in cases dealing with
radio and television programs.”). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, principally on grounds of
federal preemption. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 351-52 (9th Cir. 1964).
127
128
129
130
131
132
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What is also important to appreciate in this account is that it quite accurately
recognizes the incentive—to collect and produce prospect-specific information—
as originating in the promisee’s own assessments of the market and its value.
Protection against freeriding by a third party merely protects (or
“increase[es]”)133 the incentive, and is hardly the origin/source of it. Independent
of the promisee’s own belief (rational or otherwise) of the information being
economically valuable, the mere existence of potential liability is quite incapable
of incentivizing the production and collection of information.
2. Commercial Morality
A second rationale derives from the logic of early unfair competition
claims, and focuses on the tort’s requirement that the defendant’s actions be
independently improper/wrongful. In its focus on the means employed by the
defendant in bringing about the interference, tortious interference with a
prospect is seen as a mechanism of enforcing the prevailing norms of
acceptable interaction among competitors in the market.
This rationale tracks the role of the “improper means” requirement in the
law of trade secrets, which similarly focuses on the propriety of a defendant’s
behavior in acquiring the trade secret in question.134 And within that setting,
courts have attempted to understand the requirement as enabling the law to
convert the customary norms of commercial morality into legally enforceable
standards.135 Indeed, the Restatement defines “improper means” as those that
“fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality.”136
Maintaining the standards of “commercial ethics” is therefore seen as an
independently defensible goal for the law’s focus on the propriety of a
commercial defendant’s market actions, both within the law of trade secrets
and the tortious interference.137 In one well-known trade secret case where a
defendant had obtained information about a competitor’s industrial plant
through surreptitious aerial photography, the court had the following to say
about the means employed by the defendant and the law’s commitment to
commercial morality:
We introduce here no new or radical ethic since our ethos has never given
moral sanction to piracy. The market place must not deviate far from our
mores. We should not require a person or corporation to take unreasonable
BeVier, supra note 125, at 920.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995).
See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (“The maintenance of
standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies
behind trade secret law.”).
136 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f. (1939).
137 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481.
133
134
135
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precautions to prevent another from doing that which he ought not do in the
first place . . . . “Improper” will always be a word of many nuances,
determined by time, place, and circumstances. We therefore need not
proclaim a catalogue of commercial improprieties. Clearly, however, one of
its commandments does say “thou shall not appropriate a trade secret through
deviousness under circumstances in which countervailing defenses are not
reasonably available.”138

The reference to morality here certainly does not suggest that the
rationale is imbued with a deontic character. It is instead deeply instrumental
in orientation, and related to the recognition that industry norms and
customs present an effective (and occasionally, efficient) method of rule
development and coordination.139
The commercial morality rationale embodies its own set of deep-seated
problems. Scholars have criticized the ideal as being too vague and
amorphous, and therefore unpredictable and ill-defined.140 Additionally, to
the extent that it seeks to build on existing custom and convert those norms
into legally enforceable standards, it partakes of the myriad problems and
concerns that accompany the production and policing of customary law in
different settings.141 Perhaps most importantly though, when treated as a
freestanding rationale for tortious interference with a prospect, the
commercial morality argument effectively collapses the tort into just another
claim for unfair competition, with little regard for the tort’s emphasis on
policing the boundaries of a protectable prospect. To the extent that it is
capable of functioning as a justification then, it must do so in conjunction
with other, more far-reaching, accounts.
3. Actual/Ostensible Ownership
A third plausible justification for tortious interference with a prospect
attempts to convert its analytical basis into a normative theory. Recall that
138 E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1970).
139 See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF.
L. REV. 241, 294 (1998) (noting that “norms that survive the test of time are likely to be efficient”).
140 See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets As IP Rights, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 311, 322 (2008) (describing the tort theory as flawed because courts would be “unable to

resolve those challenges on any principled basis, instead making ad hoc judgments based on
perceptions of the defendant’s intent”); Bone, supra note 139, at 295-96 (finding that “the argument
for trade secret law based on industry norms is weak” because “the argument only works for norms
that are actually accepted” and because “[f]or an industry norm to exist, it must be part of a relatively
stable industry-wide equilibrium”).
141 See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1899, 1909 (2007) (“[T]here has been little acknowledgement of the breadth of the customary
practices and norms involved in IP and the vast influence that they wield.”).
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courts developing the tort in its early stages openly acknowledged that its
effect was to convert a contractual entitlement into an in rem obligation
against third parties.142 The normative variant of this description would argue
that tortious interference identifies a prospect as an appropriable/ownable
asset, which it then protects with a tailored exclusionary framework. In other
words, the rationale for the exclusionary regime created by the tort is the
ownership of the underlying prospect by the plaintiff.
A version of this justification is seen in the work of Richard Epstein, on the
inducement of breach.143 Justifying tortious interference with a contract as an
effort to solve the problem of ostensible ownership, Epstein argues that the
action exists to “fill the void that the more traditional notions of property may
not reach.”144 The root of his argument derives from the recognition that
ownership of labor is just as defensible and unproblematic as ownership of
physical resources.145 From that basic idea, Epstein’s account then finds it
straightforward to show that tortious interference works in identical manner as
tort claims designed to protect against interferences with physical property.146
In his analysis however, Epstein distinguishes between interference with
a contract and interference with a prospect, suggesting that the latter is
fundamentally different as a normative matter, and interestingly enough,
easier to justify in property terms.147 His reasoning for this is that “one tort
falls squarely within the traditional prohibition against force and fraud while
the other does not.”148 Since interferences with a contract are often treated as
cases of “inducement,” Epstein seems to be suggesting that tortious
interference with a prospect—rather than a contract—is indeed more
straightforward, insofar as it purports to set up a standard form of protection
against force and fraud. Actual rather than ostensible ownership is thus at the
heart of tortious interference with a prospect, in Epstein’s propertarian
account. While inducement of breach derives from gap-filling in the skein of
142 Temperton v. Russell (No.2), (1893) 1 Q.B. 715, 730 (Eng.).
143 Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 16
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1987) (determining that “[t]he tort of inducement of breach of contract is best

understood as an unsuspected manifestation of the problem of ostensible ownership”). For a
different version of the property argument, premised on first possession instead of self-ownership,
see Fine, supra note 27, at 1139-42. Fine provides a more direct defense using property terms,
especially as it relates to prospects rather than contracts, by treating prospects as an interest in a
pursuit, which the rules of first acquisition seem to protect. Fine’s underlying normative logic
however appears to be the equivalence in economic value being protected in both situations. Unlike
Epstein, Fine does not go beneath the rules of pursuit to discern an underlying justification for them
in the way in which Epstein does with ownership, albeit through Locke.
144 Epstein, supra note 143, at 19-20.
145 Id. at 20.
146 Id. at 21-29.
147 Id. at 21.
148 Id.
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standard property entitlements, tortious interference with a prospect appears
as a straightforward instantiation of ownership principles.149 Epstein makes
this abundantly clear when he concedes that in contrast to inducement of
breach, which cannot be fitted into the standard mode, “the basic justification
of the tort [of interference with a prospect] remains clear precisely because
of the close connection between this class of economic losses and ordinary
physical damages cases.”150 A protectable prospect is therefore just like any
other ownable res.
But why? The argument appears to place primary reliance on the
conceptual structure of the interference tort and its resemblance to traditional
property torts. Indeed, Epstein has adopted the same argument to suggest
that “intangible” forms of property such as patent and copyright are property
rights analogous to tangible property owing to a common conceptual
structure.151 The justification for treating a prospect as a res is therefore rooted
in the analytical structure of the doctrine, and not vice versa. A similar move
is to be seen in work by another scholar, who also seeks to offer a propertybased justification for tortious interference based on an analogy to property
law’s rules of first possession and the pursuit of animals.152 The conceptual
similarities in the doctrinal regimes (notice, privilege of pursuit, motive, etc.)
are treated as generating a normative claim for treating tortious interference
as a property tort.
The shortcomings of this approach are but obvious. The conceptual and
analytical similarity (of tortious interference) to property sheds important
light on the working of the tort doctrine and suggests that it might well be less
of anomaly than some others have made it out to be. Yet, the idea of property
as such (or of other economic interests such as a “right to trade”153) are hardly
justifications on their own right, and require the elucidation of additional
normative criteria underlying their working.154 “Property” is itself a thick

Id.
Id.
Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 425 (1975) (arguing that
patents and copyrights “create property rights” and “share the essential features of tangible
property”); Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response
to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 458 (2010) (“[H]uge returns lie from systematizing
intellectual property by analogy and extension to successful legal regimes elsewhere.”).
152 See Fine, supra note 27, at 1135-39.
153 Epstein, Intentional Harms, supra note 151, at 425 (“Bowen’s version of the prima facie tort also
requires us to give an accurate account of the interest in trade to be equated with an interest in property.”).
154 For an early recognition of the idea that property is a concept in need of justification, see
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 491 (L.A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch eds.
1978) (1739) (describing the relationship between an individual and his property as “not natural, but
moral, and founded on justice”).
149
150
151
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analytic concept,155 embodying myriad normative goals within its working,
many of which are both incommensurable and conflicting. 156 As such then, it
has little to offer as a justification for tortious interference. In addition, the
account cannot capture the nuance underlying the law’s policing of the
prospect and the emphasis that it places on the relationship between prospect
and wrongdoing; nuances and distinctions that Epstein is perfectly willing to
ignore.157 At its root then, the property-based account simplistically converts
an analogy into a normative justification, without any additional groundwork.
One important observation about this account is in order before moving
on. Unlike the two prior justifications for tortious interference with a
prospect, the ownership rationale embodies a strong non-consequentialist
component, especially insofar as it takes shape from within the idea of the
independent morality and defensibility of ownership, which are seen as
requiring no further normative defense. As we move to copyright, it is not
altogether uncommon to see similar arguments at work in explanations of
different parts of the system.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW AS TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
WITH A PROSPECT
Having examined the basic underpinnings of tortious interference with
a prospect, this Part moves to explicating the homology between the action
and copyright law. Section II.A begins with an overview of what a
“homology” entails in legal theory and why it differs from an ordinary
comparison. II.B then analyzes the commonality of pluralist normative
considerations that coexist within both institutions and routinely motivate
their functioning. II.C then provides a brief overview of copyright’s basic
structure of rights, liability, and privileges, and develops the homology more
fully by analyzing copyright’s most salient doctrinal elements through
tortious interference with a prospect.
A. Homology as Interpretive Legal Theory
As noted previously, the distinction between an analogy and a homology
is subtle yet distinct. An analogy is a mere explanatory comparison between
two ideas or concepts; while a homology does more. A homology compares

155 Thick concepts are generally understood as those that embody an evaluative content, and
require further normative criteria for their working. See generally Simon Kirchin, Introduction: Thick
and Thin Concepts, in THICK CONCEPTS 1 (Simon Kirchin ed., 2013).
156 See generally J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE (1996).
157 See Epstein, supra note 143, at 21 n.60 (“The Restatement’s total lack of form is attributable
in large measure to its effort to sweep too many disparate cases into a single rule.”).
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two ideas or concepts, but in addition purports to identify a “fundamental
truth” about their commonality that connects them in a way that is
significantly stronger than a superficial structural resemblance.158 A
commonality in origin/evolution is usually the basis of a homology.159 Such
commonality in origin need not, however, relate merely to source. It can
instead be a shared normative basis that influences the construction of the two
ideas or concepts under study, which is of special applicability in legal
comparisons. When a shared set of normative values accounts for a
commonality in the analytical structure of legal rules or principles, the
resemblance between the rules or principles may be appropriately
characterized as a homology rather than an analogy.
In this understanding then, good swaths of what is often described as
analogical reasoning in the law may indeed partake of a homology, insofar as
it is driven by a purported identification of a common causal story or origin
that is distinctively normative in orientation.160 As an example, consider the
manner in which the “implied warranty of habitability” evolved.161 In a wellknown case, Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,162 Judge Skelly Wright of the
D.C. Circuit developed the idea through a comparison with the “implied
warranty of merchantability,” in turn a staple doctrine in the law of
contracts.163 Clearly to him, the structure of both warranties had to be similar,
i.e., they both had to be implied in every contract and nonwaivable. The
decision to model one on the other—i.e., to render them structurally
similar—was driven by a common set of normative considerations, despite
the differing contexts. And these were the obvious information asymmetry
See 5 CONG. OF ARTS AND SCI., UNIVERSAL EXPOSITION 350 (Howard J. Rogers ed. 1906).
Id. at 350-51.
See EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-6 (1949) (describing
the centrality of analogical reasoning to legal argument because it “accepts the differences of view
and ambiguities of words”); LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON 19-27 (2d ed. 2016)
(summarizing cases where the court drew on analogy to interpret a statute and finding no evidence
of “any general rule from which the controlling analogies can be derived”); Scott Brewer, Exemplary
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 923, 962-66 (1996) (“[A]rgument by analogy works by comparing two items and by inferring
from the fact that these items share some properties that they share some further property . . . .”);
Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1179-83 (1999)
(describing a judge’s application of analogical reasoning as “survey[ing] past decisions,
identify[ing] ways in which these decisions are similar to or different from each other . . . and
develop[ing] a principle that captures the similarities and differences”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 743-49 (1993) (stating that
analogical reasoning requires “some principle, harmonizing seemingly disparate outcomes” in order
to produce consistency within the law).
161 See Myron Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New
Issues, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1445-46 (1974).
162 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
163 Id. at 1075-77.
158
159
160
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between the contracting parties and the gross disparity in bargaining position
during their market interaction. The similarity was thus more than just
structural and may be explained by a common evolutionary account grounded
in the goals that motivated both doctrines.
As an example from within copyright jurisprudence, consider the
Supreme Court’s development of “vicarious liability” for copyright
infringement in the case of Sony v. Universal City Studios.164 Recognizing it to
be a case of first impression, the Court referenced the “historic kinship”
between patent and copyright law to justify its reliance on patent law
jurisprudence to develop a structurally similar doctrine for copyright law.165
The Court’s logic here quite clearly had more to it than just the fact that
copyright and patent were both forms of intellectual property. It was instead
steeped in the recognition that both emanated from the same constitutional
source, which in turn specified a common normative goal for both
institutions: “promoting the Progress,” a goal that needed to produce similar
outcomes in both regimes through the use of similar principles.166
The distinction between a homology and an analogy may be better
understood through an idea made famous by the philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein: “family resemblances.”167 Wittgenstein identified a network of
similarities in sets of ideas–concepts, and argued that instead of abstracting
to a set of common or universal characters that are used to define the set, one
should better understand its constituent elements as embodying a sequential
chain of commonalities.168 In this construction, not every member of the set
would embody all the common characteristics, but each would instead be
directly related to another and the set as a whole would thus compose of
individual units that are all so directly related in some way. He called this the
idea of “family resemblance” and it has since spawned an immense amount of
secondary literature.169
464 U.S. 417, 434-39 (1984).
Id. at 439. For a critique of the Court’s approach, claiming that the argument was poorly
reasoned and researched, see Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
941 (2007). By pointing to the Court’s use of the argument here, I am certainly not suggesting that it
was correctly applied; merely that it represents an instance of a homology rather than a pure analogy.
166 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
167 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §67 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 1st ed. 1953).
168 Id. § 65-66.
169 See, e.g., Michael Forster, Wittengstein on Family Resemblance Concepts, in WITTGENSTEIN’S
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS: A CRITICAL GUIDE 66 (Arif Ahmed ed., 2010) (clarifying
common misconceptions about the concept of family resemblance); Renford Bambrough, Universals
and Family Resemblances, Meeting of the Aristotelian Society (May 8, 1961), 61 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 207, 207-22 (1960) (arguing that family resemblance solved “the problem of
universals”); Keith Campbell, Family Resemblance Predicates, 2 AM. PHIL. Q. 238, 238 (1965)
(refusing Wittgenstein’s theory to eliminate contradictions and errors as applied to predicates);
164
165
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Of importance to us though is the reality that Wittgenstein’s idea of family
resemblance quite consciously conflates two core elements, both of which set
a homology apart from an analogy. The philosopher Hans Sluga has identified
this conflation most concretely in recent work, in the process shedding
important light indirectly on the homology–analogy distinction.170 Sluga
points out that the idea of family resemblance confuses two analytically
distinct ideas. The first is what he calls the “similarity concept,” and represents
the epistemically verifiable similarity, correspondence, or identity between the
subjects under study.171 This is a structural reality, so to speak. The second is
what he calls a “kinship concept,” or the existence of some “appropriate causal
connection” between the subjects.172 Kinship concepts, to Sluga, are important
insofar as they are critical to establishing “direct and real connections, causal
links, dependencies and ‘influences’” between subjects of study.173
Homologies actively embody this idea of a kinship conception between
structurally similar objects. They combine in no small measure both elements,
since the object of the comparison is driven by a desire to establish some
relationship between the subjects being studied. Sluga’s use of the idea of a
“causal” connection identifies such a relationship rather broadly. Indeed, a
common normative consideration or motivation is analytically sufficient to
establish a common cause, i.e., that both ideas were caused by—or, brought
into existence because of—the same goals at issue. Mere analogies thus focus
principally on the similarity concept and less on the causal dimension, while
homologies embody both.
In his elucidation of this distinction, Sluga also makes an additional
observation of relevance. He notes that the relationship between the similarity
and kinship concepts is oftentimes reflexive.174 In other words, a comparison
that begins using a similarity concept will sometimes assume a kinship
dimension and vice versa. Indeed, this has been shown to be true as an
Heather J. Gert, Family Resemblances and Criteria, 105 SYNTHESE 177, 177 (1995) (arguing against an
interpretation of family resemblance and proposing an alternate understanding); Nicholas Griffin,
Wittgenstein, Universals and Family Resemblances, 3 CAN. J. PHIL. 635, 635-36 (1974) (discussing
whether Wittgenstein’s family resemblance solves the problem of universals); Pamela Huby, Family
Resemblance, 18 PHIL. Q. 66, 66 (1968) (arguing that family resemblance is not a theory, but a
repudiation of other theories); J.E. Llewelyn, Discussions, Family Resemblance, 18 PHIL. Q. 344, 344
(1968) (discussing family resemblance in regard to the function and use of “general words”);
Anthony Manser, Games and Family Resemblances, 42 PHIL. 210, 224 (1967) (finding family
resemblance of “little assistance in dealing with . . . ‘the problem of universals’”).
170 See Hans Sluga, Family Resemblance, 71 GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN 1, 14 (2006)
(“It is problematic in that [family resemblance’s] characterization draws on two quite different sets
of ideas, two different vocabularies but treats them as if they were one and the same.”).
171 Id. at 15.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 19.
174 Id. at 19-20.
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empirical matter as well.175 When two things are revealed to have a common
source/motivation, they begin to appear more similar to otherwise neutral
observers. Homologies are therefore by definition interpretive in character.
As Dworkin famously pointed out, legal reasoning—as interpretive
reasoning—involves more than just an attempt to neutrally understand a
concept. Theorizing about the law additionally embodies an effort to make
sense of a legal doctrine, rule or institution by “see[ing] it in its best light.”176
This derives from the recognition that the doctrine or institution is not a
mere artifact, but is instead motivated by some principle or purpose and
sensitive to that principle or purpose.177 Owing to this motivation/sensitivity
combination, theorizing about a legal institution becomes a value laden
enterprise, wherein the reasons for an institution or doctrine influence an
appreciation of its salient features.178 Going back to Sluga, this implies that
homological reasoning in the law will to some degree allow the kinship
concept to influence its construction of the similarity concept, a reality that
should be acknowledged. The identification of a normative goal or underlying
principle will cause some similarities or dissimilarities to be emphasized over
others, with the recognition that this is inevitable (since otherwise, the two
subjects under comparison would be identical).
This Part offers such a homological account. The account begins with an
identification of normative commonality between tortious interference with
a prospect and copyright law to show that the two are routinely justified by
reference to a common set of principles, even in the face of deep contestation
over the relative importance of these principles within that set. It then
proceeds to show how, once these principles are accepted as common, several
of copyright’s salient—and functionally significant—attributes might be
better (or best) understood through the lens of tortious interference with a
prospect to “see it in its best light.”
B. Incentives, Property, and Market Morality: Common Goals
As discussed previously, tortious interference with a prospect is justified
by reference to three different normative ideals.179 The ex ante economic
175 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Irina D. Manta & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Judging
Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 279-81 (2014) (finding that lay subjects observe greater similarity
between objects when told that one was copied from the other).
176 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 47 (1986).
177 Id. at 46-48 (explaining the two components of the “interpretive attitude,” which are (i)
that a legal rule serves a purpose and is intended to achieve that purpose, and (ii) that the rules that
embody a legal doctrine can evolve in order to serve that purpose).
178 Id. at 90 (“General theories of law . . . must be abstract because they aim to interpret the
main point and structure of legal practice.”).
179 See supra Section I.C.
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explanation sees it as essential to allowing a market participant (i.e., a
prospective contracting party) to invest into the collection of prospectspecific information by deterring freeriding by a competitor;180 the moral
explanation treats it as affirming a set of market norms and customs that are
required by a well-functioning market;181 and the property explanation treats
the prospect as akin to a property interest and therefore deserving of
exclusionary protection in its own right.182 The crucial point to remember
about these various justifications for the tort is that, despite their divergence
and varied normative inclinations, they each continue to subsist in the
working of the doctrine, and find validation in one or more elements of the
action. The ex ante perspective focuses on the intentional (or notice-driven)
aspects of the tort, the moral one on the tort’s focus on improper behavior,
and the propertarian one on the in rem nature of the action. Each of the three
explanations is therefore, in a sense, incapable of complete invalidation as
long as the tort retains its basic structure.
With copyright, we see something very similar. On the one hand, we
encounter nearly identical normative justifications for the institution. On the
other, we find all of them continuing to thrive and find partial validation in
some part of the system. In both, we therefore encounter a parallel normative
pluralism that has failed to ever impede the actual functioning (and
application) of the legal regime.
Copyright’s ex ante justification is also incentives-driven, and is today the
institution’s principal justification.183 Beginning with the premise that
copyright exists in order to “promote the progress” of the sciences and useful
arts—an avowedly utilitarian goal—the incentives account posits that
copyright law is designed to realize this goal—and therefore enhance overall
social welfare—by inducing creators to produce creative work through the
promise of temporally limited and narrowly tailored market exclusivity.184
The regime’s guarantee of a private action for an interference with such
exclusivity is believed to contribute to the very production and dissemination
See supra subsection I.C.1.
See supra subsection I.C.2.
See supra subsection I.C.3.
See Balganesh, Foreseeability, supra note 10, at 1576-77 (“Copyright law is thus thought to
exist primarily to give authors (that is, creators) an incentive to create and thereafter disseminate
their works publicly.”); Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609,
658 (2006) (“[T]he first orthodoxy of modern copyright [is that] [b]y granting more rights to
authors, copyright law provides them with more incentive to create . . . .”).
184 See Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 71, 71-73 (2014)
(“The dominant American theory of copyright law is utilitarian, in offering the incentive of limited
copyright protection to creators to generate material that is valuable to society.”); Christopher
Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 317, 317 (2009) (“[T]he
dominant justification for copyright, at least in the United States, is explicitly utilitarian.”).
180
181
182
183
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of creative expression.185 This incentives argument dominates courts’ rhetoric
about the reasons for the copyright system, and is often touted as a reason for
individual decisionmaking as well, within the functioning of copyright.186
Much like with tortious interference, a good part of copyright’s incentive is
seen as connected to the deterrent effect that the regime has on freeriding
(which it renders actionable).187
The market morality explanation within copyright, while infrequently
advanced, nonetheless informs certain parts of the system.188 In this
conception, aspects of the copyright system operate as rules of “trade
regulation” by proscribing specific forms of actionable copying, which is seen
as anti-competitive or contrary to accepted market practices.189 Much as with
tortious interference, this explanation has had fairly limited traction as a
stand-alone explanation for the entire regime and has been relegated to
specific domains of copyright’s doctrinal structure.190 Nonetheless, it
maintains a role within a part of the overall system.
The property-based explanation on the other hand, is probably second
only to the incentives argument in its influence on copyright thinking.191 In
this argument, copyright law creates a property interest in the work that it
then envelopes in a regime of exclusivity. The basis—and rationale—for that
property interest are either secondary or irrelevant once brought into
existence, much as the property arguments for tortious interference assume.
The property justification for copyright dates back to the very origins of
copyright and the idea that the system is designed to protect an ownership
interest in the same way that regular property law protects similar interests

185 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of
Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1666-67 (2012).
186 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[T]he limited [monopoly] grant . . . is intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors . . . .”).
187 Balganesh, supra note 185, at 1679.
188 For a good overview, see James Grimmelmann, The Ethical Visions of Copyright Law, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2005, 2014-31 (2009) (documenting some of these moral norms as constitutive
of copyright’s modern ethical vision).
189 See id. at 2009 (noting that “[c]ourts look to commercial customs to learn what practices
are considered unethical”); see also Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
899, 927-42 (2007).
190 One such area, for instance, is the analysis of potential market harm under the fourth fair
use factor. 17 U.S.C. §107(4) (2012). For a general discussion of courts’ proscription of practices that
violate customary industry practice, see Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in
Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1937-41 (2007).
191 For a discussion of historical notions of property rights and creation incentives within
copyright law, see NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 55 (2008).

2018]

Copyright as Market Prospect

481

in tangible assets.192 This vision of copyright is best characterized as
“Blackstonian copyright” in that it looks no further than (or beneath) the
owner’s despotic dominion to control access to the resource under protection,
once brought into existence.193 While capable of coexisting with an economic
argument, the two are nonetheless analytically distinct. Indeed, some scholars
purport to defend the property justification as capable of existing
independent of an economic rationale, in the recognition of the author’s
inherent dignitary/personality interest that is being protected through the
regime’s set of exclusive rights.194
Each of the rationales offered for tortious interference with a prospect
thus finds a strong parallel in copyright, both individually and as a
collective. The foundational values that underlie them—efficiency,
fairness, and ownership—each has an unmistakable parallel in the
copyright setting. This is hardly to suggest that one evolved from the other
or indeed was self-consciously modelled on the other. Instead, it provides
evidence of the kind of “kinship” relationship that renders the similarity
more than just of epistemic significance and suggests that the two might
have useful lessons to learn from each other.
It should therefore come as no surprise that some scholars writing about
tortious interference have attempted to use the tort’s similarity to intellectual
property in their arguments attempting to legitimize or undermine the
continued expansion of tortious interference. Richard Epstein was the
earliest to do so, in arguing that intellectual property provided the “prima
facie tort” with a justification.195 A few years later, Dan Dobbs examined the
same analogy as a potential justification for tortious interference (with an
expectancy) and found it to be lacking, insofar as it was the basis for a simple
property-driven justification for tortious interference.196 Very importantly
192 See, e.g., Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 1511, at 457 (noting how, with unauthorized
copying on the rise, “legal systems start[ed] to develop forms of copyright protection that echo[ed]
. . . the constellation of property rights over tangible objects”).
193 See NETANEL, supra note 191, at 8. See also Balganesh, supra note 2, at 1129-30 (crediting
Blackstonian normative attitudes of property as helpful in the copyright context “to conjure up
images of an owner’s absolute and unconditional right to exclude others from a resource”).
194 See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1997 (2006) (arguing for protection of moral rights “aimed
at preserving an author’s dignity” in addition to copyright’s traditional exclusive rights, which “afford
economic protection”).
195 See Epstein, Intentional Harms, supra note 151, at 425 (analogizing the creation of property
rights for intangible assets through copyright or patent to protection of trade). Much like Epstein,
one other writer has drawn on intellectual property to explain tortious interference by suggesting
that the analogy justifies the law’s willingness to recognize a property interest even without a
heightened notice requirement. Fine, supra note 27, at 1133-34.
196 Dobbs, supra note 55, at 352-55. Dobbs’ simplistic treatment of intellectual property as just
another form of property does little justice to the complex normative goals underlying different
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though, all of these accounts use intellectual property to try and justify
tortious interference, and never the other way around.
Both tortious interference and copyright law therefore remain motivated by
the same confluence of complex normative goals. These goals may of course
point in different directions, assume different color, and suggest different
analytical devices when rendered operational. Yet they do suggest—at the very
least—a plausible normative “kinship” between the two regimes. Even if Dobbs
is correct that the similarity is not strong enough to independently justify the
very existence of one by relying on the other, the normative kinship nonetheless
points to lessons that they each might learn from similarity to the other, once
both are presumptively justified (in their very existence).
C. The Homology
While the copyright statute is today characterized by multiple layers of
regulatory complexity, the institution’s core apparatus remains fairly
straightforward.197 Indeed, much of it has stayed constant ever since the
origins of the institution in the eighteenth century.
Stripped down to its essentials, copyright law protects original
expression that qualifies as a work of authorship by creating a cause of action
for a defined set of acts when not authorized by the copyright owner.
Copyright realizes this structure through the creation of a set of “exclusive
rights” to conduct or authorize certain activities using the protected work.198
When another person performs those acts without the authorization of the
copyright owner, those actions qualify as an “[i]nfringement” of the owner’s
exclusive rights, i.e., of the copyright entitlement.199 Most importantly, as a
regime of private law, merely because something qualifies as an
infringement does not mean that it will be penalized.200 It is only when the
copyright owner chooses to commence an action that the infringement
becomes enforceable.
intellectual property regimes. Indeed, from his description, one suspects that he sees little
justification for the expansion of intellectual property, causing him to see its extension to tortious
interference as doubly problematic. See id. at 354 (noting that the evolution of tortious interference
has not proceeded with the same caution as patent law in granting monopolies or property rights).
197 See, e.g., Joseph Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 94-100 (2004) (discussing the
complexification of copyright’s regulatory structure compared to the previously simple common law
framework, but noting that the changing law “retained, at its core, many aspects of the property
rights model . . . . underlying the early copyright acts”).
198 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
199 Id. §501(a) (2012).
200 For a fuller account of this, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of
Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1666-76 (2012); see also
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 771 (2013)
(“[C]opyright law depends entirely on private enforcement via infringement suits.”).

2018]

Copyright as Market Prospect

483

Not every unauthorized act involving the protected work, however,
need qualify as an infringement. Copyright law has multiple safety valves
built into its entitlement delineation strategy. First, as part of the prima
facie case, copyright usually requires establishing that the defendant
engaged in the act of “copying.”201 Unsurprisingly, copying is more than
just a factual question of appropriation202—it also embodies a normative
dimension. Thus, even when a plaintiff establishes that the defendant
appropriated content from the protected expression, the court must
determine whether the copying was “wrongful” or “improper” as such for
it to be actionable.203 This is a heavily evaluative inquiry involving a variety
of factors.204 Second, copyright law also insists that wrongful actions of the
defendant embody a “volitional” element, where the human agency
involved can be discerned.205 With developments in technology,
disaggregating the volition and automated parts of wrongful conduct has
emerged as an important part of the inquiry, not just for the act of copying
but for all putatively wrongful behavior that might qualify as
infringement.206 Third, and perhaps most saliently, wrongful conduct does
not qualify as infringement at all when the behavior is seen by the system
as normatively privileged under the “fair use” doctrine.207 Even when
protected, a defendant’s use of the work is on occasion seen as socially
beneficial and therefore exempted from the gamut of infringement
altogether. The behavior is in an important sense “privileged.”208
Exclusivity, copying, volitional conduct, and contextually privileged
behavior thus form the four basic conceptual cornerstones of the copyright
system. Each of these elements may however be understood and interpreted
through the lens of tortious interference with a prospect, which sheds light
on the important principles seen in their functioning, and in turn allows
them to be infused with additional analytical content.
201 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (“Absent copying there can be no infringement of
copyright.”).
202 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203,
215 (2012) (explaining that copying is “both factual and normative,” and requires not only “the
existence of actual copying” but also that the copying be “improper”).
203 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946).
204 Balganesh, supra note 2022, at 242-61 (discussing in depth the variables considered in the
two step inquiry for substantial similarity).
205 For an excellent recent discussion of the existing legal position and the conceptual
confusion underlying the idea in copyright jurisprudence, see Robert C. Denicola, Volition and
Copyright Infringement, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1259, 1270-84 (2016).
206 Id. at 1284. See also id. at 1283-84 (discussing “the possibility of secondary liability for
copyright infringement” based on factors like “knowledge, inducement, and financial gain” even if a
court concluded that the defendant had a “lack of volition”).
207 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
208 See generally WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1985).
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1. The Market (for the Work) as Prospective Economic Advantage
For quite some time now, copyright law has been deeply conflicted about
the appropriate target of its protection. One conception, usually traced back
to the very origins of the institution, focuses on the protection of the author
and on the practice of “authorship” as central to copyright’s functioning.209
This is believed to have manifested itself in the author-focused debates that
eventually led to the passage of the first copyright statute in the Englishspeaking world, the Statute of Anne.210 A second conception, which is
believed to have gained prominence in the last few decades, instead focuses
on the work, rather than the human agency which produces it.211 Authorship
here becomes important only insofar as it is responsible for the production of
the work, and not independently. The work in turn assumes a life of its own
once brought into existence.212 Peter Jaszi argues that the focus on the work
emerged in the mid-eighteenth century, when the “commercialization and
commodification of print culture” grew.213
Regardless of when the shift to a thing-like conception of the work
emerged, it today continues to confound copyright reasoning.214 The doctrine
of originality is a good example of an area where this problem persists.
Originality is meant to operate as an assessment of the work’s creativity as well
as a verification of the source of such creativity. A work is original if it exhibits
a “modicum of creativity” and/that “owe[s] its origin” to the author claiming
copyright.215 As is obvious, this construction conflates the precise target of
the originality assessment. On the one hand, it appears to be the work, insofar

See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 3-4 (1993).
Id. at 31-48; see also Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
“Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 468-71 (outlining the debates surrounding and theory underlying
the Statute of Anne).
211 See Jaszi, supra note 210, at 472-80 (“[A doctrinal reversal] followed from the emergence of
the ‘work’ concept as a new source of guidance and constraint in copyright, called forth by the
inherent instability of the ‘authorship’ construct itself.”); see also MARK ROSE, AUTHORS IN COURT:
SCENES FROM THE THEATER OF COPYRIGHT 182-85 (2016) (“[B]oth the Statute of Anne and the
U.S. Copyright Act of 1790 place authors and their works at the heart of copyright doctrine.”).
212 See Jaszi, supra note 21010, at 477-80 (“[U]nfurling the banner of ‘authorship’ was completed
through the legal objectification of the fruits of creative labor.”).
213 Id. at 473.
214 For a useful account, see Michael J. Madison, The End of the Work as We Know It, 19 J.
INTELL. PROP. 325, 332 (2012) (“At times the work is what the author says it is, or what we
understand the author to have intended; at times the work is what is original, or what is fixed in
some tangible object . . . .”); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Causing Copyright, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 35 (2017) (“The tasks of independently determining whether something was a ‘work of
authorship’ and whether an actor was an ‘author’ began to recede in importance . . . .”).
215 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346-47, 363 (1991).
209
210
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as any originality is meant to be assessed from the face of the work.216 On the
other hand, it extends to the author, who must have some connection to the
work and its original components for the originality to be authorial. The
conflation is today crystallized in the Copyright Act, which defines its object
of protection as a “work of authorship,” seemingly incorporating both the
work and the author as the targets of protection.217
Approaching the issue through tortious interference with a prospect
produces an additional, and far more plausible, idea: modern copyright law’s
real object of protection is neither the work (qua property), nor the author (qua
actor). Instead, and to the extent that a utilitarian argument holds sway over
American copyright thinking, the object of protection might be understood as
the economic benefits offered by the potential market for the work at issue.
This refocusing of emphasis is at once simple and of some significance.
To begin with, it helps account for the reality that copyright has never in
its history attempted to graft an exclusionary regime simply around the work,
in the way that property law does for a tangible object.218 At the same time,
neither has copyright law really ever engaged the idea of authorship or the
construction of the author as a doctrinal matter.219 And yet, during the
infringement analysis, in the fair use doctrine, and in its computation of
damages, the prospective market for the work emerges as a functionally
significant construct. The infringement analysis purports to examine the
substitutionary effect of the defendant’s copying on the plaintiff ’s work,220
while a central part of the four-factor fair use doctrine examines the effect of
a defendant’s copying on the “potential market” for the work.221 Similarly, in
216 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01
(2015) (“Originality in the copyright sense means only that the work owes its origin to the author
. . . .”).
217 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
218 See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 4 (1967).
219 See Balganesh, supra note 2144, at 11-34; Jaszi, supra note 210, at 481-85 (“The objective test
of copyrightability for derivative works proposed here—that they contain ‘distinguishable variations’
from the underlying works on which they are based—is one that focuses attention on the work, rather
than its ‘author.’”); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law,
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2003) (“[I]f authors are as central to copyright as I claim, I must also
acknowledge that copyright doctrine on authorship, both here and abroad, is surprisingly sparse.”).
220 The focus on the ordinary observer during the infringement analysis has been commonly
understood as assessing whether the “intended audience”—representing the market for the work—
would find the two works at issue to be substitutes in their similarity to each other. For a judicial
articulation, see Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990) (justifying the
intended audience approach “[i]n light of the copyright law’s purpose of protecting a creator’s
market”); see also ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN
COPYRIGHT LAW § 3.2.2 (2014) (“Under the intended audience test, the court determines the
subjective similarity between two works . . . from the perspective of the group that is the market for
the work, that is, the work’s intended audience.”).
221 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).
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computing actual damages, copyright law allows a plaintiff to claim lost
profits (from a market) as a measure of damage.222 Each of these doctrines
therefore hints at a prospective market (for the work) being the true basis of
protection. The idea also fits well with copyright’s modern focus on market
incentives as its principal justification.
Much like a prospective advantage that is protected against interference,
the market for a protected work of expression remains a probabilistic
entitlement. Its actual realization is far from certain; yet at the same time its
occurrence evinces a degree of plausibility that the legal regime treats as
sufficient to warrant protection. Recall that in the tortious interference
context, courts have adopted the general position that the expectancy/prospect
needs to be more than just a subjective speculation, but must instead have a
reasonable possibility of being realized—both causally and contextually.223 To
be sure, courts have generally disfavored mere “lost opportunit[ies]” as
protectable prospects, especially when they are largely speculative and show
no proof of a specific relationship.224 All the same, they have been willing to
countenance lower probability expectancies when a compelling public policy
reason required such encouragement.225 Transposing these to the market for a
work suggests that parallels might be easy to locate.
The very protectability of the work—in terms of the subject matter and
the myriad criteria for copyrightability—implicate the system’s legitimate
belief that the work embodies some market potential. Indeed, the very marketbased rationale of the copyright system, i.e., the idea that the logic of the
market induces creative production, would be amiss if protectability did not
correspond to a reasonable belief that the copyright system wants actors to
rely on.226 It is of course another matter that the system’s criteria for
protectability do not reflect an abiding concern with such market potential.227
Additionally, the whole premise of copyright—traceable back to the
Constitution—is that the inducement of creative works inures to the public
good as a whole and “promot[es] the [p]rogress” of society.228 At its roots, a
Id. § 504(b).
See supra text accompanying notes 94–105.
See, e.g., Blank v. Kirwan, 703 P.2d 58, 70 (Cal. 1985); Westside Ctr. Assocs. v. Safeway
Stores 23, Inc., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 803 (Ct. App. 1996); Asia Inv. Co. v. Borowski, 184 Cal. Rptr.
317, 323 (Ct. App. 1982).
225 See Youst v. Longo, 729 P.2d 728, 735 (Cal. 1987) (indicating that protection of “the integrity
of civil litigation” is one such compelling public policy reason).
226 See Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, supra note 10, at 1573 (“[C]opyright
exists primarily (if not entirely) to provide creators with an incentive to produce creative expression
through the promise of limited exclusionary control over their creative work.”).
227 Id. at 1581-89. (“Despite copyright being premised entirely on the idea of incentives, courts
never look to its theory of incentives in delineating the scope and extent of a creator’s entitlement
in individual cases.”).
228 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
222
223
224
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strong public interest pervades the very existence of copyright protection. The
system is therefore set up with the idea that people should rely on it to realize
this public purpose. This reality should then allow for significant leeway in the
level of certainty demanded by the law for the protection of a prospect and
should readily accommodate the idea of protectability being a useful proxy.
Even if one accepts protectability as a good proxy for the prospect, the
precise boundaries of that prospect will require some delineation since in
theory the market for a work is boundless. Especially given that the copyright
system is not trying to preclude all uses of the work (as patent law purports
to), the market for the work—actual and prospective—will require
independent specification even when reframed as a prospect. This might be
achieved through the use of objective expectations (e.g., reasonable
foreseeability229) or through a mechanism that is roughly similar to antitrust
law’s “relevant market” determination.230 In either structuring, the device
would seek to ensure that the market for the work—the protected prospect—
tracks the objectively reasonable expectations that a creator might have,
rather than a purely subjective desire for a windfall. In crucial ways, such a
process of delineation would represent a significant improvement over the
current system, which delegates the determination of what the protected
work is to the individual plaintiff instead of adopting an objective standard.231
The recasting suggested here would enter the fray as a mechanism for
tailoring the plaintiff ’s claim during an infringement action, rather than as a
facet of copyrightability since it relates primarily to infringement rather than
validity.232 The plaintiff ’s action—both by claim and remedy—would then be
limited to unlawful interferences with the market that the court/law identifies
as a reasonable expectation for the work at issue. The court would now have
to examine whether the plaintiff ’s infringement claim pertains to a market
benefit that constitutes a reasonable expectancy, i.e., whether it would have
likely been realized/realizable by the plaintiff absent the defendant’s
229 See Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, supra note 10, at 1603-25 (advancing a
proposal that copyright infringement be limited to “foreseeable copying” in order to limit the scope
of exclusive rights to the expected market).
230 For the relevant market determination, see Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust
Market Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 64 (1984) (“Courts should apply the
protected interest, market transaction, burden-shifting orientation consistently in all cases involving
relevant market definition.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 960-63 (1981); Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and
the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1813 (1990).
231 See Paul Goldstein, What is a Copyrighted Work? Why Does it Matter?, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1175,
1176-77 (2011) (“[A copyrighted] work is whatever the author says it is . . . . In the overwhelming
majority of cases under the 1976 Act in which the copyrighted work determined, or at least influenced,
the legal outcome, the court . . . simply rubber-stamped the author’s identification of his work.”).
232 For a fuller discussion of the difference, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2204-14 (2016).
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interference, similar to the inquiry in tortious interference with a prospect.233
Its most direct application would likely be in relation to the reproduction and
derivative works rights, where the boundaries of the market remain uncertain
in practice.234 Thus an author of a computer software program would, for
example, ordinarily be unable to claim infringement when an aesthetically
pleasing part of that code is reproduced in an art work and framed as such,
unless the author can prove that such an aesthetically-focused reproduction
or derivative use of the work is a “reasonable” expectancy for literary works
based on evidence of a licensing market/practice related to such uses.
In addition to taking shape from the context of the work and associated
market variables, the reasonableness of the expectancy would also be
influenced by the overarching public policy motivating the regime, echoing
the Court’s own “recognition that some works are closer to the core of
intended copyright protection than others.”235 Purely factual, or minimally
original works would thus have a narrower market domain, and conversely
highly original works would obtain a broader scope of protection. In the
abstract, this might seem like a complex task for courts to undertake; yet in
practice, it has worked rather well in tortious interference and allowed courts
to eliminate purely speculative claims from the system.
2. Copying as Interference and Improper Means
Not all uses of a protected work, however monetizable, amount to
copyright infringement. Ever since its origins in the eighteenth century,
copyright law has consciously chosen to avoid crafting its bundle of owners’
privileges in property-like terms. Some property scholars have described this
as the copyright’s choice of a governance-based liability regime over a purely
exclusion-driven one.236 As Ben Kaplan put it many decades ago, copyright’s
set of exclusive rights focus on describing exclusive rights in “way[s] to
replicate the work.”237 Copying therefore forms the principal form of action
that copyright law treats as an actionable infringement. The Supreme Court
put the point most profoundly and directly, when it emphasized that “[a]bsent
233 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 638 (“The plaintiff ’s prospect or economic opportunity must be
one that the plaintiff would likely have captured but for the defendant’s interference.”).
234 See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 212-18 (1983) (“Having determined that a derivative right is in issue, it is far
more difficult and consequential to draw the line that separates infringing from non-infringing
derivative uses . . . . Judicial guidance has been uncertain at best.”).
235 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
236 See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information,
116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1799 (2007) (noting that “[e]xclusion and governance can be contrasted” as ideas
when thinking about property rights).
237 KAPLAN, supra note 218, at 40 (emphasis added).
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copying there can be no infringement of copyright.”238 With the development
of new technologies, this has of course changed somewhat, such that today
some forms of infringement—such as a public performance or public
display—do not require copying in the strictest sense.239 Nonetheless, for the
most part, copying is essential for infringement.
Despite the centrality of copying to infringement, “[n]ot all copying,
however, is copyright infringement.”240 This obviously complicates things
further. To qualify as infringement, the copying certainly must involve an act
of appropriation—i.e., of accessing a protected work and replicating its
expression in whole or in part without authorization.241 Yet, it must do more
than just be an instance of unauthorized appropriation. It needs to be
“improper” or “wrongful,” something that copyright jurisprudence has
struggled to make complete sense of for over five decades now.242 In addition
to involving an act of appropriation and crossing a quantitative threshold (i.e.,
not be de minimis), the copying must also be qualitatively significant for it to
be actionable. Ordinarily a question for the jury, this evaluative dimension of
copying has proven to be difficult to distill down using specific normative
criteria, with the result that courts (and juries) adopt a range of approaches
and criteria during the determination.243
In tortious interference with a prospect, the “interference” refers to more
than just the defendant’s actions that produce a particular result, namely the
nonrealization of the economic prospect. It instead entails a close scrutiny of
the particular means employed by the defendant, which must in addition evince
components that are illegal, unlawful, or unethical.244 In focusing on the
propriety of the means employed for the interference, the tort can be seen as
doing two things simultaneously. First, it takes attention away from a simplistic
focus on result for actionability.245 Second, it then examines—on an individual
basis—whether the defendant’s behavior should be objectively understood as
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4)–(5) (2012).
Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
See Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in
Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1188-89 (1990) (“The defendant must have seen or
heard the plaintiff ’s work at some time prior to creating his or her own work and have used plaintiff ’s
work in some fashion as a model. Thus, ‘copying’ . . . is the obverse of independent creation.”).
242 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (noting that, once copying is
established, the plaintiff bears the additional burden of showing that the copying was illicit). For a
fuller discussion, see Balganesh, Normativity of Copying, supra note 202, at 214-33.
243 Balganesh, Normativity of Copying, supra note 202, at 230-33.
244 See supra subsection I.B.2.
245 This is a corollary of the basic rule that bringing about an interference is not actionable as
such, unless accompanied by improper means and the appropriate intention. See Restatement (First)
of Torts § 766 cmt. d (1939) (noting that liability for tortious interference requires purpose by the
tortfeasor to bring about the harm).
238
239
240
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normatively problematic in the eyes of the action at issue (i.e., tortious
interference), not just in the abstract. Consider a situation where a defendant
willfully misrepresents information to a party, which in turn produces the
nonrealization of the prospect. In a claim for tortious interference with a
prospect, the law takes attention away from the mere nonrealization of the
prospect and instead focuses on whether the misrepresentation—even if/when
not actionable as an independent wrong—is of the kind that tortious
interference with a prospect should consider problematic. The tort thus
emphasizes a means–ends convergence for actionability.
The focus on improper means—for the interference—can therefore be
understood as the tort’s effort to draw attention to the relationship between
four components in an analytical sequence: normative defect, action, outcome
and consequence. Unless all four are aligned, the interference is not
actionable. A tangible economic loss (consequence) from the plaintiff ’s nonrealization (outcome) of the probable prospect is necessary, which should be
the result of the defendant’s act of interference (action), in turn carried out
in a manner that displays behavior which the tort deems inappropriate as a
normative matter (defect). Looking to copyright’s analysis of copying reveals
a symmetrical structure.
Even when shown to exist as a factual matter, a defendant’s copying must
be “improper” to be actionable.246 While it is true that the analysis of
impropriety does not scrutinize the process of copying in the way that tortious
interference does, a closer examination reveals that it does purport to examine
the existence of a means–ends alignment within the act of copying. What
ultimately makes an act of appropriation wrongful is the assessment that it
amounts to a form of freeriding on the parts of a work that produce a copy
with substitutionary potential in the marketplace.247 In other words, the law’s
use of the word “substantial” is a stand-in for whether the substitutionary
potential of the copy was real, rendering the freeriding wrongful. Mere
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
This is also accounted for by the focus on the ordinary observer to assess the similarity
between the works, which is meant to serve as a proxy for an assessment of the substitutionary
potential. The court in Arnstein observed:
246
247

The plaintiff ’s legally protected interest is . . . his interest in the potential financial
returns from his compositions which derive from the lay public’s approbation of his
efforts. The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff ’s works so
much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for
whom such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated
something which belongs to the plaintiff.
Id. at 473. (internal footnote omitted); see also Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734
(4th Cir. 1990) (“In light of the copyright law’s purpose of protecting the creator’s market, we think
it sensible to embrace Arnstein’s command that the ultimate comparison of the works at issue be
oriented toward the works’ intended audience.”).
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substitutive similarity without such freeriding is insufficient, as is the mere
act of freeriding without the production of a substantially similar copy. True,
the evaluation of the means here is not one of examining the precise
mechanism/method employed by the defendant during the copying, or of its
ethics as such (e.g., bad faith, or use of a purloined copy). It is nevertheless a
means-assessment in that it scrutinizes how the substitutive significance was
realized during the appropriation, so as to warrant characterization as a
wrongful act when the act is of the kind that copyright law should consider
problematic in light of its normative goals. We then see an analytical pattern
emerge here that is largely identical to that of tortious interference with a
prospect. Copyright law treats an actual or imputed economic loss
(consequence) from the creation of a substantially similar copy (outcome) as
an actionable wrong when the result of a defendant’s appropriation of
expression (action) that is seen as an evaluatively undesirable instance of
freeriding on the plaintiff ’s work (defect).
The normative defect attaches to the action, and taints it, which in turn
extends to both the outcome and its eventual consequence. Both tortious
interference and copyright law exhibit an interesting parallel in this sequence.
Table 1: Analytical Parallels in Behavior under Scrutiny
Tortious Interference

Sequence

Copyright Infringement

Economic Loss

CONSEQUENCE

Actual or Imputed Loss

Nonrealization of Prospect

OUTCOME

Substitutive Copy

Interference with Realization

ACTION

Appropriation of Expression

Ethically Suspect Behavior

DEFECT

Substantial Freeriding

The parallelism revealed by the homology also sheds light on how
copyright’s analysis of wrongful copying might be recast to better realize its
purported means–ends alignment. To the extent that the wrongful copying
analysis examines whether the defendant’s actions are improper—as a form of
appropriative behavior—copyright law would do well to set out the normative
variables that it uses to judge such behavior. While the delineation may be
difficult to achieve in abstract, it may well be realized through specific
behavioral proscriptions that guide future defendants and aid courts (and
juries) in their decisionmaking. In other words, the wrongful copying test
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might be better served by breaking it down into specific process-based
components that are used to judge a defendant’s actions.248 Examples might
include: the extent to which the defendant’s copying attempts to actively
conceal its appropriation, whether it copies elements other than the plaintiff ’s
work, the ease/difficulty involved in the appropriation at issue, and whether
such appropriative behavior is commonplace in the creative sector under
consideration. Considerations such as these would most overtly convert the
inquiry into a means-based scrutiny. In the end, what the parallelism reveals
then is that “copying” in copyright law encompasses not just the interference
(action), but also the very impropriety of that action, which renders it a wrong.
3. Volition, Subconscious Copying, and Intention
For quite some time now, copyright jurisprudence has remained unclear on
whether copyright infringement embodies an implicit requirement of volitional
conduct, for liability to attach.249 In other words, must a defendant’s actions have
been volitional, in the sense of being under the willing control of the defendant?
Much of this debate arises from the fact that copyright infringement has often
been characterized as a “strict liability tort,” implying that neither intention nor
negligence were prerequisites for the imposition of liability.250
Despite this, a few courts that have considered the issue have concluded
that an infringement nonetheless requires an element of “volition[al]”
conduct on the part of the defendant, before liability can attach.251 Thus, one
court held that the operator of a Bulletin Board Service (BBS) could not be
liable for infringing content uploaded by a user without some volitional
conduct on the part of the operator.252 Another court put the point event
248 For a recent effort in this direction, see Patrick Goold, Unbundling the “Tort” of Copyright
Infringement, 102 VA. L. REV. 1833 (2016). Goold proposes recasting the infringement analysis into
five separate categories based on the particular normative goal at stake. See id. at 1838 (outlining
“five distinct ‘copy-torts’” that protect different interests). Yet Goold’s framework does little by way
of suggesting specific criteria that the analysis needs to focus on to connect the defendant’s actions
to the notion of wrongdoing for which the law is attempting to impose liability.
249 See Denicola, supra note 205, at 1260 (“Several federal court decision have expressed
uncertainty about the existence of a volition requirement.” (internal citations omitted)).
250 See, e.g., Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y., 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“Copyright infringement is a strict liability wrong.”); see also Educ. Testing Serv. v. Simon, 95 F.
Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (describing copyright infringement as a “strict liability tort”).
But see Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
305, 310 (2015) (“[D]espite the widespread and orthodox belief [to the contrary] . . . . copyright
infringement is not a strict liability tort because it does not hold the defendant liable simply
[because] he infringed a right of the plaintiff. In addition, it must be shown that the defendant’s
copying was wrongful.”).
251 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
252 Id. at 1372-73.
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more directly, noting that while an infringement “does not require that the
infringer know that he is infringing or that his conduct amounts to a willful
violation of the copyright owner’s rights, it nonetheless requires conduct by a
person who causes in some meaningful way an infringement.”253 And this
requirement of conduct, in turn, must exhibit “a nexus sufficiently close and
causal to the illegal copying that one could” impute the illegality to the
conduct (i.e., classify it as an infringement).254
These observations seem to confirm that the act of infringement
embodies an element of voluntary conduct on the part of the defendant.255
They imply that (i) an act, as opposed to a mere omission, is crucial for
conduct to be infringing; (ii) such act must be voluntary, in the sense of being
under the willing control of the defendant; and (iii) no independent scienter
requirement attaches to the idea of a volitional act. “Copying,” as the term is
understood in copyright law, must therefore embody an element of volition.
On closer reflection however, the idea is more complicated than it first seems.
The paradigmatic act of copying—in its most basic sense—involves the
process of appropriating expressive content from some source. It is true that
copyright law does not care one bit whether that act was accompanied by a
determinate knowledge as to the owner of the content being appropriated, an
intent to so appropriate it, or indeed some negligence or recklessness on the
part of the copier. At the same time however, the act of appropriation is not
a simple physical act that is capable of being context-insensitive in the way
that an act like speaking is. It involves a level of contextual advertence that a
simple physical act (e.g., running) does not, since it always needs an object,
being intransitive in construction. Put simply, copying requires advertence to
the original—whatever is copied from. Copying therefore involves four
elements: (i) prior expression in existence, (ii) knowledge of the existence of
such expression, (iii) actual access to such expression, and (iv) a taking of
such expression in the copier’s own use. For the copier to take expression, the
copier must know of the existence of such expression and have access to it.
Absent the copier’s knowledge of the expression being copied, it is
CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 550.
In its decision in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., the Supreme Court
appeared to eliminate the requirement of volition altogether in relation to the public performance right,
which as noted previously, does not embody the requirement of copying. 134 S.Ct. 2498 (2014). The
dissent, in particular, took exception to this seeming omission by the majority. Id. at 2512-14 (Scalia, J.
dissenting). Yet, a more plausible reading of Aereo is that the majority was adopting a presumptive
approach to the question of causation, based on legislative history, which treated the broadcaster as
having performed the broadcast, even when the viewing was under the immediate control of the enduser. Id. at 2506. See also Denicola, supra note 205, at 1293-95 (“The majority [in Aereo] did not
specifically mention ‘volition.’ . . . . The court’s analysis was cut short [by its application of] the
Copyright Act. Since cable companies clearly perform under the Copyright Act, so did Aereo.”).
253
254
255
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meaningless to allege copying. Without such minimal advertence, copyright’s
core idea of independent creation would prove meaningless;256 mere
similarity would form the basis of liability, without any concession for the
possibility that such similarity was realized through means other than
copying. The requirement of volition underlying copyright law therefore
flows analytically from the type of action at issue, i.e., copying, and its simple
pre-requisite of some minimal advertence.
While copyright infringement has thus come to be understood as
requiring an element of volition, copyright law has over the years also
developed a rule that copying can be both conscious and subconscious.257 On
the face of things, subconscious copying appears to contradict the advertent
component of copying, and with it the understanding of copying needing to
be a volitional act. Copyright jurisprudence allows a defendant to be held
liable for infringement even when shown to have copied the protected work
without actual knowledge of such copying when it occurs.258 A defendant’s
good faith claim to have forgotten about the work that is copied from is
therefore treated as irrelevant to infringement.259 On the face of things, this
appears to contradict the volitional nature of copyright infringement. Yet,
acknowledging liability for subconscious copying does not deny the
requirement of volition for copying. Here again, looking to tortious
interference with a prospect sheds light on how the facial contradiction
between these two propositions in copyright law (i.e., volition and
subconscious copying) might be reconciled.
As an intentional tort, tortious interference insists that for liability to
attach, a defendant (i) must actually know about the plaintiff ’s prospect, and
(ii) intentionally interfere with that prospect.260 As noted previously, a
defining feature of a prospect—in contrast with a contract—is the
probabilistic nature of the plaintiff ’s benefit. This difference influences
courts’ understanding of knowledge. The knowledge (of the prospect) that
courts look for in a defendant is therefore of a lower magnitude than it is for
a contract. One important respect in which this difference manifests itself is
in the specificity of the prospect. To establish knowledge of a protected
prospect, courts generally take the position that the prospect must merely be
identifiable, and that the “specific identity or name” of the party/entity

256 For an account of independent creation and its centrality in copyright law, see ABRAHAM
DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? 85-110 (2015).
257 For further discussion of this topic, see 4 NIMMER, supra note 216, §13.08.
258 ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 1983)
(“‘[I]nnocent’ copying can nevertheless constitute an infringement.”).
259 Id.
260 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 638.

2018]

Copyright as Market Prospect

495

comprising the prospect is unnecessary.261 This is in contrast to the
requirement of intention, which they hold to a much more stringent standard.
A defendant must have acted with the purpose of interfering with the
prospect, or with the substantial certainty that the actions will result in such
an interference.262 A mere intentional act that incidentally results in an
interference is insufficient to meet the requirement.263
What explains the variation in courts’ treatment of the knowledge and
intention requirements of tortious interference with a prospect is the
distinctive analytical role that each plays within the tort. The knowledge
requirement is constitutive of an interference—as an act, rather than an
omission or a result. To therefore engage in the act of interfering with a
prospect, at a minimum an actor must know of its plain existence. To
“interfere” with something implies a conscious act that inhibits an outcome,
rather than just the result of the outcome not being realized.264 As with
copying, much of this flows from the fact that an act of interference demands
an object for its reference owing to its intransitive construction. The intention
requirement on the other hand is not constitutive of the behavior being
described, which can be fully described without such intention (i.e., a simple
interference, or a negligent interference). The intention therefore accompanies
the behavior (interference) at issue, whereas the knowledge (of the object) is
treated as constitutive of it. The distinction between a constitutive state of
mind and an accompanying one also explains how copyright law can embody
a volition requirement, while simultaneously adopting an account of
subconscious copying.
The idea of subconscious copying confirms the idea that copying—for
infringement purposes—need not be conscious, in the sense of embodying a
scienter requirement. It therefore reiterates the idea that liability for copyright
infringement is strict. On the issue of copying, it also supports courts drawing
an inference that copying did in fact occur, from the circumstantial elements

261 See, e.g., Ramona Manor Convalescent Hosp. v. Care Enterprises, 225 Cal. Rptr. 120, 126
(Ct. App. 1986), as modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 5, 1986). (“The rule does not require, however,
that the person who loses the performance of the contract as a result of the conduct of the actor
should be specifically mentioned by name. It is sufficient that he is identified in some manner . . . .”
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. p (1979))).
262 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 621; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965)
(“The word ‘intent’ is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor
desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially
certain to result from it.”).
263 Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 112 P.2d 631, 633 (Cal. 1941) (“If the actor had no knowledge of
the existence of the contract or his actions were not intended to induce a breach, he cannot be held
liable though an actual breach results from his lawful and proper acts.”).
264 See Interference, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (17th ed. 2016) (defining an
“interference” as the act of “meddl[ing] with” something “without having the right to do so”).
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of access and similarity even when a defendant quite credibly denies having
engaged in a conscious taking of expression.265 In other words, subconscious
copying does not negate the reality that the putative copier had some
knowledge about the expression that was eventually copied, which is a
constitutive dimension of the very idea of copying, when stripped down to its
fundamentals.
Thus, an individual who heard some popular music in his childhood, and
many years later produced his own music incorporating into it elements of
what he heard in his childhood might be said to have engaged in subconscious
copying, insofar as he was unaware of his use of the prior expression in his
own music and was not consciously deploying that knowledge.266 Yet, even
here we do not deny (a) the existence of knowledge (about the protected
music) in the copier at some point in time,267 or that (b) the copier deployed
this knowledge in his own use. Subconscious copying is therefore perfectly
compatible with a volition requirement underlying copying and its core idea
of advertence to the protected original. Indeed, another way to understand
their compatibility—drawing on tortious interference—is in the recognition
that the advertence demanded by volition is internal to the very idea of
copying, whereas the consciousness or subconsciousness that the
jurisprudence on that question discusses goes to the defendant’s particular
state of mind accompanying the copying, i.e., it is superimposed on the
constitutive advertence. Volition is constitutive of the very act of copying,
whereas the question of consciousness (or lack thereof) is about the
defendant’s state of mind accompanying the act. Copying can therefore be
both subconscious and volitional at the same time.
Examining copyright’s volitional act requirement (for infringement)
through tortious interference and its understanding of an interference thus
reveals two important insights about copyright law. First, that the act of
copying does indeed embody such a requirement, flowing as it does from the
minimal advertence that the very act of copying/appropriation demands.
Second, that such volition does little harm to the basic conception of
copyright infringement as a “strict liability tort,” whether or not one considers
it worthwhile retaining that oft-stated understanding of infringement.
265 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (“If there is evidence of access and
similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must determine whether the similarities are sufficient to
prove copying.”).
266 See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 483-85 (9th Cir. 2000).
267 Id. Indeed, in the case, the court looked at the defendant’s actions and admissions to effectively
infer such knowledge circumstantially, since there was no direct evidence of such prior knowledge. The
defendant himself “believed he may have been copying someone else’s song” even though he didn’t
remember precisely which one it was. Id. at 484. Nonetheless, the court’s reasoning was clearly premised
on the fact that such knowledge did exist at a prior point in time, however remote.
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4. Fair Use as Privileged Interference
A plaintiff ’s entitlement in copyright law is subject to several important
limitations and exceptions, of which the privilege of fair use is perhaps the
best known.268 Originally a creation of courts in the nineteenth century and
today codified in the statute,269 the doctrine of fair use exempts an act of
infringement from liability if it complies with a set of four factors, each of
which is to be weighed and considered using the facts of an individual case.
These factors focus on the nature and purpose of the defendant’s use of the
work, the amount and substantiality of the defendant’s copying, the nature
of the protected work, and the effect of the defendant’s use on the market
for the protected work.270
A major unresolved controversy of some significance in copyright
jurisprudence is whether fair use should be a part of the plaintiff ’s prima facie
case, or instead an affirmative defense.271 The characterization determines
which party bears the burden of proof for the issue, and the stage at which
the issue is introduced during the proceeding. While this controversy is seen
to have a largely procedural and evidentiary aspect to it, it masks a deeper
confusion—namely, the substantive overlap between the established elements
of the plaintiff ’s prima facie case and the fair use doctrine.
As is well known, a central element of the plaintiff ’s prima facie case of
infringement is that the defendant copied the plaintiff ’s work, which in turn
requires proof that the defendant actually appropriated content and that the
appropriation was quantitatively and qualitatively “substantial” so as to be
actionable.272 This latter inquiry, the substantial similarity analysis, thus
probes the magnitude and significance of the copying at issue,273 which is
almost identical to the “amount and substantiality” of the defendant’s use,
which fair use considers as an important factor in its analysis.274 It therefore
appears redundant to undertake this inquiry twice.

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122 (2012).
Id. For an overview of the origins of the doctrine, see generally Matthew Sag, The PreHistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1371 (2011).
270 17 U.S.C. § 107.
271 For an examination of the origins of these divergent views, see Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use:
An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685, 685-710 (2015).
272 See Latman, supra note 241, at 1188-89. (“[C]opying, in order to be prima facie actionable,
must include three elements: (1) The defendant must have . . . used plaintiff ’s work in some fashion
as a model . . . . (2) The material copied . . . must be such as enjoys protection under copyright,
[and] (3) [S]uch protected material must be ‘substantial.’”).
273 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d. Cir. 1946) (“The question, therefore, is
whether defendant took from plaintiff ’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners
. . . that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”).
274 See 17 U.S.C. §107(3).
268
269
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A large part of the confusion for this redundancy appears to be a result
of the origins of fair use. When it emerged in the nineteenth century, its
core tenets came to be expounded as part of the infringement analysis—i.e.,
on the issue of actionable copying—rather than as an independent
doctrine.275 This accounts for why—even through much of the twentieth
century—courts treated precedent on fair use and actionable copying as
interchangeable in their logic.276 Congress then for the first time codified
the fair use doctrine in 1976, but in doing so said nothing at all about the
infringement analysis, thereby seemingly acquiescing to its existing
structure.277 This triggered the need to identify a separate domain for the
fair use doctrine.
To avoid some of this redundancy, some courts came to treat fair use as an
“affirmative defense,” meaning that the defendant alone bore the burdens of
persuasion and proof on the question.278 Neither the plaintiff nor the court
were under any obligation to consider it if the defendant did not bring it up.
As early as 1985, the Supreme Court confirmed the idea that fair use was an
affirmative defense,279 and a decade later affirmed the idea most concretely by
noting that this meant that the defendant bore the “burden of demonstrating
fair use.”280 This position has persisted ever since.
Yet, it sits somewhat oddly with the plain language of the copyright
statute, which defines a copyright owner’s exclusive rights with the opening
observation that the exclusive rights are “[s]ubject to section[] 107,” the fair
275 The origins of the doctrine are traced back to the opinion of Justice Story in Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Folsom developed the central tenets of fair use as part of
the question whether the defendant’s copying was exempt from liability for copyright infringement,
rather than as a defense. Id. at 348. For an account of the case and its influence since, see L. Ray
Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431 (1998).
276 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement Analysis,
68 STAN. L. REV. 791, 842-44 (2016) (“[In Arnstein], Judge Frank’s citation to cases of ‘abridgement,’
‘compilations,’ and ‘quotations of works of criticism’—three forms of copying that offer the copier a
defense to an infringement claim—suggest that he conflated the standard for infringement with
defenses to infringement.”).
277 The infringement analysis finds no mention whatsoever in the copyright statute, or in the
legislative history accompanying its enactment. Id. at 862-63.
278 See, e.g., Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1976)
(“[The defendant] asserted, as [an] affirmative defense . . . the defense of fair use”); Ass’n of Am.
Med. Colleges v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 151 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff ’d, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.), and aff ’d
sub nom. Appeal of Mikaelian, 734 F.2d 6 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he fair use exception to the Copyright
Act is an affirmative defense”); Roy Exp. Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liecht., Black Inc., A. G. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff ’d sub nom. Roy Exp. Co.
Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982)
(“[T]he fair use defense is an affirmative defense”).
279 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (“The
drafters resisted pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive categories of fair use,
but structured the provision as an affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case analysis.”).
280 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
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use provision.281 This has caused several academic commentators to
forcefully argue that fair use was intended—and had always been—a part of
the plaintiff ’s prima facie case rather than an affirmative defense, especially
given its close connection to the elements of the infringement analysis.282
Somewhat more recently, this argument has begun to receive limited judicial
validation. In one case, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the characterization of
fair use as an affirmative defense, and emphasized that it should be
understood as a “right,” but nonetheless retained placing the burden for it
on the defendant.283 The Ninth Circuit, however, took this logic one step
further in a case involving a notice and takedown provision of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).284
The provision in question, § 512, enables a copyright owner to require a
service provider to take down from its servers any content that infringes its
copyrights.285 To enforce this request, the copyright owner sends the provider
a “takedown notification,” with which the provider complies in order to avoid
liability.286 In its decision, the Ninth Circuit concluded that regardless of how
one characterizes fair use—i.e., as a right or as an affirmative defense—in a
takedown notification, the plaintiff–copyright owner should bear the burden
of addressing it.287 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized the consequences of the classification over nomenclature. For
now, the court’s logic is of course limited to § 512. Yet, as an analytical matter
it applies with equal force to the standard infringement case as well. And this
in turn brings us back to square one: if fair use is indeed a part of the
plaintiff ’s prima facie case, how should the law account for the obvious
substantive redundancy in the two?
In tortious interference with a prospect (and contract), the jurisprudence
has similarly oscillated between identifying aspects of the defendant’s
behavior as components of the prima facie case and as better suited to an
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
See, e.g., Loren, supra note 271, at 710 (“Campbell’s embrace of the notion that fair use is an
affirmative defense . . . . was an error of statutory interpretation with seriously problematic First
Amendment consequences.”); Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
135, 155-69 (2011) (“The placement of the fair-use provision in Chapter 1 suggests a presumption of
fair use.”); Haochen Sun, Fair Use As A Collective User Right, 90 N.C. L. REV. 125, 136 (2011) (“The
broad language used in section 107 of the Copyright Act . . . . does not, however, clear away all the
uncertainty . . . . Despite the persistent uncertainty lingering around the fair use doctrine, fair use
has uniformly been treated as an affirmative defense.”); see also, e.g., Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use:
Burden of Proof As Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1788 (2010) (“Tellingly, the Copyright
Act never labels fair use an affirmative defense.”).
283 Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir. 1996).
284 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2016).
285 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
286 Id. §§ 512(c)(1)(C) & (c)(3).
287 Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1153-54.
281
282
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independent privilege or justification, burden for which is placed on the
defendant.288 One early commentator on tortious interference thus drew a
distinction between the “prima facie tort” and the question whether the
invasion was “privileged or justified.”289 In this dichotomy, the rational for
the division appears to lie in its allowing the court to better realize the
balancing exercise involved. Historically, the distinction came about owing
to the tort’s relatively insignificant focus on the improper or wrongful
nature of the defendant’s behavior, in comparison to its effect, i.e., the
interference.290 The plaintiff therefore merely had to show an intentional
interference, and the defendant then could prove that the interference was
justified or privileged.291 Today, with the law having moved to incorporating
an “improper means” element in its understanding, the division makes little
analytical sense. Indeed, some cases even go so far as equating improper
means with “unjustified” and placing the burden for it on the plaintiff, so
as to eliminate all doubt.292
The modern trend in tortious interference cases is therefore to treat
what used to be the defendant’s privileges as a part of the prima facie
case.293 All the same, this does not mean that the law has come to eliminate
all use of affirmative defenses. As the leading treatise notes, in the modern
understanding affirmative defenses in tortious interference actions
represent situations where the defendant raises a claim unrelated to the
culpability of its actions under the tort.294 In other words, when the
defendant introduces a new consideration into the equation, that was not
directly related to the action (as a substantive component), it rightly
remains an affirmative defense. The Texas Supreme Court’s decision in

288 See DOBBS, supra note 23, § 620 (noting how under the traditional rule “the defendant
could escape liability only by showing a privilege and shouldering the burden of justifying the
interference”).
289 Carpenter, supra note 21, at 745.
290 See DOBBS, supra note 23, § 620.
291 Id.
292 As Dobbs observes:

Many of cases that place the burden of proof upon the plaintiff do so by saying that
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s interference was “unjustified.” That might
sound as if the plaintiff is required to prove a negative—the total absence of
justification. However, the statement probably only means that the plaintiff must
present evidence and persuade the jury that the defendant’s conduct was improper
because of the means used to interfere, or, perhaps, because of a wrongful purpose.
Id.
293 See, e.g., Advance Sign Grp., LLC v. Optec Displays, Inc., 722 F.3d 778, 786 (6th Cir. 2013);
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1042 (Ariz. 1985); Leigh Furniture & Carpet
Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 305 (Utah 1982).
294 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 620 n.6.
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Wal-Mart Stores v. Sturges is illustrative.295 In Sturges, the court concluded
that it made little sense to speak of an independent defense or justification
if it was merely a denial of some part of the plaintiff ’s case.296 On the
other hand, when it involved something completely unrelated, such as a
claim of “complete or qualified privilege,” it rightly remained a defense.297
Since Texas law requires the defendant’s means under tortious
interference with a prospect to be independently actionable but not
recoverable, the court specifically held that exemptions from such
actionability that arise from independent considerations remain defenses
that are to be raised by the defendant.298
The core distinction therefore appears to be the extent to which the
defense introduces altogether new normative considerations into the equation.
These considerations are new only in the sense that they are not a direct part
of the prima facie case for the tort, nor subsumed under its elements. An
“absolute judicial privilege” is an example in situations where the plaintiff
claims an interference with a prospect based on false testimony.299
Tortious interference provides us with a way to think about the rightversus-affirmative defense debate in fair use and potentially address the
redundancy concern noted earlier. To the extent that the fair use inquiry
deals with considerations that are more germane to the infringement
analysis, they are better dealt with in the latter. Thus, questions about the
quantum and significance of the defendant’s copying—relative to the
plaintiff ’s work, or the originality of the plaintiff ’s work, are better dealt
with in the plaintiff ’s prima facie case. All the same, there remain additional
considerations relating to liability (for copyright infringement) that are (i)
specific to the defendant, and (ii) about which the defendant is obviously
best positioned to introduce evidence and information. Introducing these
considerations into the equation does more than just negate/deny the
plaintiff ’s case, it raises a new claim. It mimics what theorists of the common
law refer to as a “plea in avoidance” or of “confession and avoidance.”300 It
operates as an affirmative plea, in that by introducing new considerations
into the liability determination, the plaintiff must now be given an
opportunity to respond to it.301
52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001).
Id. at 726-27.
Id.
Id.
See DOBBS, supra note 23, § 620 n.6 (“For example, the absolute judicial privilege may be
an affirmative defense available even when the plaintiff has proved wrongdoing, say by a witness’
false testimony that leads others to breach contracts with the plaintiff.”).
300 Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 566-68 (1973).
301 Id. at 567. For an application to copyright law, see generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The
Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664 (2012).
295
296
297
298
299
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In this reformulation, the problem becomes less about mere
nomenclature, but instead about differentiating between the myriad
categories of claims that are today collectively described as “fair use” claims,
based on the underlying normative considerations at work.302 Claims that
focus entirely on the amount and significance of the use, as well as the
purpose (commercial or noncommercial) to which the use is put are likely
better dealt with as part of the prima facie case.303 On the other hand, when
the defendant’s use involves a narrative about types and forms of art and the
introduction of new meaning from a new context so as to claim a
transformation, it directly implicates free speech and First Amendment
considerations, which are better balanced against copyright’s utilitarian goals
independent of the prima facie case.304 Along the spectrum will obviously
arise a variety of different situations, which courts should be willing to
wrestle with as a normative matter to determine whether they are better
dealt with under the prima facie case or as a defense—taking a cue from how
tortious interference has arrived at a workable equilibrium on the very same
question. While there may be no easy (or one-size-fits-all) answers to the
problem, looking to tortious interference suggests a pragmatic method for
arriving at them.
*

*

*

The homology between copyright and tortious interference with a
prospect suggests new ways of constructing and interpreting the regime’s
various core tenets. Each of copyright’s central premises—the protectable
interest, copying, volitional conduct, and fair use—has an important parallel
in the different elements of tortious interference with a prospect. Table 2
summarizes the homology described and the interpretive insights that flow
from it.

302 See generally Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009)
(providing a comprehensive review of the categories of fair use claims).
303 E.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014) (addressing whether a
university’s electronic course materials copied too much from copyrighted works or whether it was
a fair use).
304 E.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (addressing appropriation art as fair
use); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (considering whether a
parody is fair use).
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Table 2: Interpretive Parallels and Reform Insights from the Homology
Tortious
Interference
Element

Copyright Element

Tentative Reform Suggestion
from Homology

Prospective Economic
Advantage

Actual/Potential Market
for the Protected Work

Determining the scope and
boundaries of the market based on
a “reasonable expectancy”

Interference—Actual
and Improper

Copying—Actual and
Wrongful

Directly addressing the normative
criteria which make copying
“wrongful” or “improper”

Knowledge of Prospect

Advertence to Protected
Expression (Volition)

Confirmation of a volitional
element in the idea of copying and
its compatibility with strict liability

Privileged/Justified
Interference

Fair Use

Differentiating the infringement
analysis and fair use based on
considerations underlying the claim

III. IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS
Beyond the immediate doctrinal ramifications just discussed, the
homology between copyright and tortious interference also embodies broader
lessons for copyright jurisprudence and thinking. This Part considers three
such implications. The first is justificatory, relating to copyright’s theory of
incentives; the second conceptual, pertaining to how copyright is thought of
by courts and scholars as an analytical matter; and the third is institutional,
suggesting that the copyright system should place greater faith than it
currently does in the ability of courts to tailor the entitlement.
A. From Incentive-Creation to Incentive-Protection
As noted previously, the most commonly advanced justification for
modern copyright law today is the utilitarian theory of creator incentives.305
305 See Balganesh, supra note 10, at 1577 (“Central to all of copyright law is the idea of
incentives.”); Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 (2003) (“[I]t is through
incentive language that judges are most empowered to make copyright law work as it should.”);
Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1198-1204 (1996).)
(“[The expansion of] copyright protection . . . has been accompanied by rhetoric championing the
needs of the deserving author, emphasizing the need to induce creative activity, or both.”).
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According to this account, copyright operates by inducing creators to produce
creative expression through the promise of limited market exclusivity—i.e., a
set of exclusive rights—in the work so created.306 The very rationale for
copyright is seen as emanating from the regime’s ability to thus induce
creators into producing work, which eventually inures to the benefit of the
public by enhancing social welfare.307
Characterizations of the incentives account do more, however. Not only do
they portray the logic of incentives as the only rationale for copyright law and
suggest that creators have no other reasons to create their works, but they also
all too readily conflate the incentive produced by copyright (law) with those
generated independently by the market. Consider the following statements
about copyright’s theory of incentives, all drawn from Supreme Court opinions:
o “By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright
supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”308
o “The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort.”309
o “The provision of incentives for the creation of new works is surely an
essential means to advance the spread of knowledge and learning.”310
Each of these statements assumes that copyright law originates the
incentive for creation that influences creators to produce. By “suppl[ying],”
“creat[ing],” and “provi[ding],” the incentive to create, copyright is believed
to function as an inducement for creativity.311
Even assuming the account to be true as regards creators’ motivations, the
characterization is grossly misleading. As a structural matter, it altogether
disregards the role of the market in generating the incentive, which copyright
is necessarily parasitic on. Without a plausible market for a work, no amount
of copyright protection can induce creative production. All that copyright
does is inject the element of exclusivity over an identified terrain of the

306 See id. at 1203 (“[T]he limited grant [of rights] is a means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors
by the provision of a special reward.”).
307 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003) (“The dynamic benefit of a property right is the
incentive that possession of such a right imparts to invest in the creation or improvement of a
resource in [a] period . . . .”).
308 Harper & Row Publ’rs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (emphasis added).
309 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984) (emphasis added).
310 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012).
311 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558; Sony, 464 U.S. at 450; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889.
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market, rendering the exploitation of the market easier. When that terrain is
nonexistent, the exclusivity is superfluous.
Thus, a novelist who believes that her book is likely to sell several copies
on the market, which she can rely (with some confidence) as accruing to her
because of copyright, might indeed be induced to write the novel. But if she
knows that there is no market for the book to begin with—for whatever
reason—under the incentives logic (assuming a basic level of rationality) she
will have no reason to write the novel in the expectation of thereby accruing
profits. Without a realizable market potential, copyright’s ability to induce
creative expression is a simple nonstarter. When the novelist assesses the
demand for the potential novel to be nonexistent, copyright cannot artificially
and independently create a market for the work.312
What this suggests then is not that copyright has no role to play in the
incentives account, or that the incentives account is untrue. It suggests simply
that the incentives account entails a symbiotic relationship between
copyright’s promise of exclusivity and a realizable market for the work, which
copyright law has no independent say in. Copyright shapes a putative market
potential through its set of exclusive rights, by raising the prospect of its
realization. But that is a far cry from creating or supplying the incentive on its
own, in the way that courts caricature the justification.
Rebecca Tushnet has made a similar point in prior work, calling into
question the presumptive analytical independence of copyright and market
incentives. While characterizing it as a “failure of incentive,” she notes that
“regardless of the strength of protection, it is the likelihood of success in the
market—a highly unpredictable variable, and one that [copyright] law can do
little if anything to affect—that is key to whether new authors reap rewards
from creating works.”313 Of course, an unpredictable incentive can be an
incentive nonetheless, especially when actors are overconfident.314 While the
connection between copyright law and market incentives may not point to the

312 Another way of putting the point is to note that if copyright is about curing a market failure,
a market failure presumptively requires the existence of a market to begin with, which must then
fail. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975,
991-96 (2002) (“[E]xisting economic analysis suggests no reason to presume, as a market failure
approach necessarily does, that private markets will necessarily . . . prove efficient at ensuring
adequate supply and dissemination of copyrighted works.”).
313 Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 513, 517-18 (2009).
314 See generally F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3, 20
(Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (“To the extent that investments in technological and artistic
creation are motivated by the longshot hope of a very large reward, intellectual property policies
should sustain and reinforce that incentive system, not undermine it.”).
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failure of the incentive theory, it reinforces the idea that copyright’s account
of incentive creation is dependent on the market (i.e., market demand).
Empirical proof aside, copyright’s theory of creator incentives therefore
requires some readjustment, so as to acknowledge its dependence on the
market (and on market demand). Without such an acknowledgment, its causal
role risks being overstated. Tortious interference with a prospect provides the
theory with a perfect mechanism for this readjustment—one that allows the
incentives account to continue as a theoretical model, while readily
confirming its dependence on the market. The answer thus lies in recognizing
that copyright does not create the incentive to produce work, instead it protects
that incentive when generated by the market.
The incentive, if any, lies in the market prospect that a creator sees as a
potential source of returns when the work is created and marketable.
Copyright recognizes that this incentive is a low-probability one if unfettered
freeriding (copying) is allowed, and therefore generates a structure of
rights/liability to render the prospect easier to realize, i.e., it raises the
probability of its realization by the creator. It thus takes a major component
of the uncertainty surrounding the market prospect—relating to its
appropriability, based on freeriding—altogether out of the equation. This
readjustment also confirms an insight, made famous by Ed Kitch many
decades ago within the patent context, about the ability of market prospects
to act as incentives for risky activity.315
The tortious interference homology therefore compels an important
modification to copyright’s dominant justificatory theory, introducing a
nuance into its formulation that takes it away from the realm of pure rhetoric
and caricature that seems facially implausible (e.g., absent copyright, there
would be no incentive to create). In so doing, the justification says nothing
about the empirical basis for the theory and the assumptions that it relies
on316 but suggests spending more attention on the details of the underlying
market for the work and its construction of demand when speaking of
copyright’s function as an inducement for creativity.

315 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
266 (1977) (presenting a view of “technological innovation as one in which resources are brought to
bear upon an array of prospects, each with its own associated sets of probabilities of costs and
returns”). For a recent elaboration, see John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 439, 443 (2004) (“[T]he prospect features of the patent system . . . are important
because they determine not whether rents will be dissipated, but how they will be dissipated.”).
316 See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 29, 32 (2011) (“[T]here has been relatively little critical evaluation
of the empirical legitimacy of the theoretical assumptions about copyright as an incentive.”).
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B. The Relationality of Right and Liability
Ever since its origins, copyright’s dominant conceptual discourse has
framed the institution as granting authors a set of marketable exclusive
rights.317 These rights are, in turn, deemed capable of independent analytical
delineation.318 This trend has continued even after copyright’s domain has
expanded to cover new subject matter and novel forms of creativity.
Yet, the reality remains that each of copyright’s basic rights relates to
potential behavior (on the part of a potential defendant) that requires
elucidation on its own. In other words, each of the rights works by rendering
such behavior within the exclusive domain of the author to engage in or
authorize. The exclusive right to reproduce, copyright’s most fundamental
right, is contingent on an understanding of reproduction. It grants the author
the exclusive right to engage in such behavior. However, without a clear
understanding of what exactly such behavior entails, it remains impossible to
know what the author has an exclusive right to. And for this, copyright looks
to its understanding of “copying,” developed as part of the standard
infringement analysis.319 So it is with the exclusive right to publicly perform
the work too.320 Absent an understanding of a public performance that is
unauthorized and potentially infringing, it is impossible to know what goes
into the author’s exclusive right to publicly perform the work, or to authorize
such a performance.
In a sense then, rights under copyright are each little more than exclusive
rights to engage in behavior that defendants cannot. But what that behavior
is is hardly self-evident or obvious. This is vastly different from other rights,
such as property’s right to exclude, where the directive is both self-evident
and clear, owing to the existence of an identifiable res.321

317 The origins of this can be traced back to the Statute of Anne, which spoke of the “sole right
and liberty” of printing being granted to authors. 8 Anne c. 19, § 2 (1710) (Gr. Brit.) (emphasis
added). This has continued for nearly two centuries now. Both the 1909 and 1976 copyright statutes
in the U.S. phrased their grant in terms of “exclusive rights.” Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No.
60-349, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (“[A]ny person entitled [to copyright] . . . shall have the exclusive
right . . . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . has [] exclusive rights . . . .”).
318 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (delineating each of the author’s individual rights); Copyright
Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (also delineating these rights).
319 OSTERBERG, supra note 220, §1:1. For a detailed discussion of this origins of this analysis,
see Balganesh, Questionable Origins, supra note 276.
320 17 U.S.C. §106(4).
321 See JAMES E. PENNER, The Duty of Non-Interference and Ownership, in THE IDEA OF
PROPERTY IN LAW 128, 128-29 (1997); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to
Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 612
(2008) (“The claim-right to exclude is understood through the correlative duty it imposes on others
(in rem) to ‘exclude themselves’ from an identifiable resource.”).
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In Hohfeldian terms, copyright’s exclusive rights are in reality privileges
rather than rights.322 As distinguished from a right, a privilege entitles its
holder to engage in an action without anyone else having legal recourse to
prevent such action.323 Its correlative is a “no-right” in that no one has a legal
claim to prevent its exercise.324 Most importantly, though, the opposite of a
privilege is a “duty,” and, as Hohfeld emphasizes, the duty takes the “same
content or tenor” as the privilege.325 Thus, a privilege to enter is the negation
of the duty to stay off. The exclusive privilege to copy is therefore the
opposite of the duty to not engage in such copying, though both take common
color from the idea of copying, i.e., the behavior that is both privileged and
proscribed by the directive.
Tortious interference with a prospect very much captures this idea of the
relationship between privilege and duty (or, in non-Hohfeldian imprecise
terms, right and liability). The prospective economic advantage is but a
privilege, rather than a physically identifiable asset. The copyright
infringement plaintiff ’s exclusive privilege (of realizing the prospect) takes
color and tenor from the restriction on the defendant’s behavior relating to
that prospect. Right and liability are thus relationally connected, with each
incapable of being understood without the other.326 The plaintiff has no
abstract entitlement/claim to the prospect as such, other than a privilege which
corresponds to the defendant’s obligation to not interfere with the plaintiff ’s
attempt to realize it. The plaintiff ’s right is dependent on the defendant’s
wrongful act, without which the right is substantively indeterminate.
Copyright law would do well to acknowledge and admit the existence of
a similar relationality between its conceptions of right and liability (or
entitlement and wrongdoing). As noted previously, in tortious interference
this relationality produces an inverse correlation in the plaintiff ’s case: the
greater the wrongdoing, the more willing are courts to find a protectable
prospect and vice-versa.327 Something similar already exists within copyright
jurisprudence as well, which is rarely acknowledged. Works accorded weak—
or “thin”—protection, owing to their minimal originality, are saddled with a
higher threshold of copying to establish actionable wrongdoing.328
Conversely, highly original works obtain thick protection, and courts require
322 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 32 (1913) (“The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off.”).
323 Id. at 32-33.
324 Id. at 33.
325 Id.
326 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 638.
327 See supra discussion accompanying notes 86–88.
328 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“[C]opyright
in a factual compilation is thin.”); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Satava
possesses a thin copyright that protects against only virtually identical copying.”).
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a lower standard to establish infringement.329 In this variation, we have what
is in effect a relational structure between the author’s “right” and the law’s
measure of wrongdoing.
Embracing the relationality of right and liability in copyright law is much
more than just an academic exercise. It entails recognizing that,
fundamentally, not all copyright protection is the same, and that protection
means different things for different works and different contexts.330 This, in
turn, would move copyright jurisprudence away from its banal use of property
metaphors and ideas to understand the institution. At the same time, it would
acknowledge the reality that different forms of creativity and creative
processes are underserved by a simplistic one-size-fits-all approach to the
copyright entitlement.
C. Trusting Courts
For the last several decades, copyright jurisprudence has come to place
increasingly less reliance on courts. Whereas courts were considered active
participants in copyright lawmaking under prior statutes, the 1976 Copyright
Act minimizes their role and sees them as faithful enforcers of statutorily
created directives.331 This mistrust, however, goes well beyond judicial
lawmaking. It extends to courts’ role in shaping and delineating the copyright
entitlement contextually in individual cases. Not only did earlier copyright
jurisprudence look to courts to formulate copyright rules and principles in
individual cases, it also relied on them to tailor parties’ entitlements in
individual cases so as to give effect to those rules and principles.
Courts therefore unhesitatingly engaged copyright policy at the retail
level—as opposed to the wholesale/systemic level—asking whether particular
goals were being furthered in individual cases and shaping the parties’
entitlements accordingly. The mid-twentieth century opinions of Judge
Learned Hand represent a perfect example of this phenomenon at work.
Working through copyright’s competing considerations and ideals, he
developed nuanced techniques for delineating entitlements in different
329 See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir.
1982) (“At the opposite end of the spectrum lie the ‘strongest’ works in which fairly complex or
fanciful artistic expressions predominate over relatively simplistic themes and which are almost
entirely products of the author’s creativity rather than concomitants of those themes.”).
330 For an early identification of this concern, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law
of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 518 (1945) (“The author’s monopoly or his remedy
sometimes ought to be specially shaped to suit the particular form of his creation or the particular
type of reproduction.”).
331 See Pierre N. Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1061-62 (2002) (“Courts
are regarded with suspicion when they interpret statutes, as if they were out to thwart the intentions
of the legislatures.”).
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categories of copyrighted works. Only some of these have obtained the level
of notoriety and admiration that they deserve, such as the abstractions formula
of Nichols.332 Others, such as his idea of relying on the melody of musical works
to identify their originality for infringement purposes—a method he called
the comparative method333—or his idea of the “embellishments” approach to
delineating the scope of protection in a derivative work vis-à-vis the material
that it is based on,334 are less well-known and rarely discussed.
Contrastingly, in recent times this form of retail-level entitlement
delineation has become a rare occurrence. Two factors have contributed to this
reality simultaneously. The first is the insistence—seen in the 1976 Act and
afterwards—to comprehensively codify and define critical aspects of the
copyright entitlement such that courts were meant to be faithful interpreters
of a congressionally predetermined logic.335 Consequently, any purpose
driven shaping of the entitlement became difficult to realize in the face of the
statute’s overt one-size-for-all approach and the law’s efforts to cloak its
purposes behind the veneer of neutral textual directives.336 The second is the
growing emphasis on lay juries in copyright adjudication. Today, several
crucial elements of copyright adjudication require the empaneling of a jury.337
The infringement analysis is but one obvious area.338 As more and more
circuits have moved to treating what were initially questions of entitlement
delineation in copyright—such as the idea–expression dichotomy,339
332 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“Upon any work . . . a
great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well . . . . [B]ut there is a point in
this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected . . . .”).
333 See Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 875-76 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), aff ’d, 183 F. 107 (2d Cir. 1910)
(“If the melody of the defendant’s chorus be transposed into the key of three flats, it exhibits an
almost exact reproduction of the complainant’s melody.”).
334 Stodart v. Mut. Film Corp., 249 F. 507, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), aff ’d, 244 F. 513 (2d Cir. 1918)
(“[I]t is a good copyright in so far as the embellishments and additions to the plot are new and have
been contributed by the copyright.”).
335 See Leval, supra note 331, at 1062 (“Rather than passing brief statutes and relying on courts to
find sensible solutions to emerging problems of interpretation, legislatures now write statutes hundreds
of pages long, which seek to answer from the outset every problem that can conceivably arise”).
336 See id. (“Interpretation must hew as closely as possible to a statute’s most literal terms, no
matter how senseless such a reading may be.”).
337 For a useful discussion, see 3 NIMMER, supra note 216, § 12.10. Nimmer notes that even when
there are obvious areas that a judge—as opposed to a jury—is better positioned to decide, to the extent
that the determination involves disputed facts, a jury needs to be empaneled. Id. § 12.10[B].
338 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1946) (discussing the favorability of
utilizing a jury in the context of factual similarities in infringement cases).
339 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 216, § 13.03[B][2][a] (“Where only the plaintiff ’s idea has been
appropriated, protection must be found, if at all, on a theory other than copyright infringement.”);
see also JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir. 2007) (“It is not the idea of a
farting, crude man that is protected, but this particular embodiment of this concept.”); NEC Corp.
v. Intel Corp., No. C-84-20799-WPG, 1989 WL 67434, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989) (concluding
that question of idea–expression distinction goes to infringement, not copyrightability).
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merger,340 and originality341—as more appropriately dealt with as part of the
infringement analysis, these questions have ceased to be immune too from
the jury. This growing insistence on juries for core copyright questions has
quite understandably produced a good degree of reluctance among district
courts to deal with complicated entitlement-delineation questions in
copyright on their own, for obvious fear of reversal on appeal. In the end, the
real loser has been copyright jurisprudence.
Tortious interference with a prospect has had a long pedigree of success
with such retail level delineation of the entitlement. Its very construction of
the plaintiff ’s protectable economic prospect (prospective economic
advantage) involves mapping broader considerations about the market and
party behavior therein, on to individual claims in a contextual manner. And in
that task, it has routinely trusted courts to work the system’s goals pure over
time. This has in turn produced important—and workable—variations in rules
between different contexts and facilitated an evolution of standards over time.
An important systemic lesson that copyright reform efforts should learn
from tortious interference lies in the utility of judicial entitlement tailoring at
the retail level, as an effective supplement to the system’s realization of its
goals and purposes in the aggregate. To the extent that copyright law has
certain identifiable goals underlying its very existence (e.g., inducing
creativity, or promoting free speech), it would do well to instantiate those goals
doctrinally on an individual basis. Here, courts will have to play a crucial role.
To be sure, scholars have previously proposed such retail level tailoring in
different contexts,342 and a few courts have even attempted to instantiate such
mechanisms in individual cases.343 These proposals have for the most part
fallen on deaf ears, with recent discussions of copyright reform largely

340 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 216, §13.03[B][3] (discussing the move towards treating merger
as a part of the infringement analysis and describing it as the “better view”); see also Ets-Hokin v.
Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2000); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700,
705 (2d Cir. 1991).
341 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 216, §13.03[B][2][b] (“[I]f the work . . . is not the product of his
original authorship . . . then only a very close similarity, verging on the identical, will suffice to
constitute an infringing copy.”).
342 See, e.g., Stadler, supra note 189, at 942 (“In providing creators with exclusive public
distribution rights, Congress would enable copyright owners to capture the value . . . without forcing
the public to sacrifice other interests that copyright law was meant to promote.”); see also, e.g.,
Balganesh, Foreseeability, supra note 10, at 1604-05 (“The requirement of ‘foreseeable copyright’
would ask whether the defendant’s use . . . was forseeable to the plaintiff—in form and purpose—when the
work was created.”); Chafee, supra note 330, at 510 (“The scope of protection for each kind of property
. . . should be shaped to do the most good.”).
343 The idea of “thin” protection for works that embody significant unprotected content is one
relevant example. This was entirely a creation of the courts, with no guidance from the statute. The
Supreme Court eventually affirmed the idea, too. See Balganesh, Normativity, supra note 202, at 22126 (discussing the idea of copyright entitlement “thickness”).
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limiting themselves to the role of Congress.344 The solution may therefore
well require a more overt statutory affirmation of the legitimacy, utility, and
effectiveness of such judicial tailoring by courts (within the copyright
statute), relying on the historical successes of the common law in this
endeavor. Until this occurs, one suspects that the reform—if any—will have
to occur incrementally.
CONCLUSION
Ever since its origins, copyright law has relied on metaphors and analogies
to explain its functioning and to justify its very existence. In so doing it has
striven to simplify and disaggregate its analytical and substantive complexity
through comparisons to other areas. Over the years, these comparisons have
served to solidify the status of copyright as an easily understandable subject
area, one that generalist judges can interpret and apply with ease. At the same
time however, these comparisons have underplayed the significance of
copyright law’s own normative goals and structural nuances, about which they
have contributed very little. The comparisons have for the most part been
functionally unidirectional.
Homological comparisons—between copyright and other areas—serve to
remedy this unidirectionalism by allowing copyright to better reflect on its
own internal structure owing to the commonality of normative goals. In so
doing, they reveal underappreciated nuances within the conceptual structure
of the copyright system and the ease with which these nuances might be
rendered into reality in the actual functioning of the institution. The
homological account offered here, between copyright and tortious
interference with a prospect, represents precisely such an effort.
While tortious interference with a prospect has been in existence for quite
some time now, it has received surprisingly little scholarly analysis. All the
same, it remains a fairly robust stand-alone cause of action within the
common law. Its fairly unique doctrinal and conceptual structure, and the
plurality of goals that it embodies, make it well-suited as a lens through which
to analyze different aspects of copyright law. Viewing copyright through
tortious interference with a prospect sheds important light on a variety of
problems within copyright jurisprudence and suggests easy fixes to them. It
allows copyright’s entitlement structure to more fully capture its probabilistic
nature and focus on the centrality of the potential market for the work, injects
some analytical sense into the infringement analysis, enables the notion of

344 See, e.g., Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315,
322-24 (2013) (suggesting that courts are “reflecting the wear and tear of the [copyright] statute” and
proposing a comprehensive revision).
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volition to have a firmer grounding in determining liability for infringement,
and suggests a workable means of differentiating between the plaintiff ’s
prima facie and a defendant’s fair use defense. Beyond these doctrinal lessons,
it also recommends important theoretical and institutional implications for
our thinking about the copyright entitlement and courts’ approach to it.
Perhaps more so than anything else though, the homology showcases the
perils of copyright exceptionalism, the belief that copyright law is best
understood as distinct from other areas of the law. While copyright law has
been—and can be—fruitfully understood through the use of cognate
disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities, it is only rarely that
courts and policy-makers look to other areas of law for insights, both
analytical and normative. The homology to tortious interference with a
prospect shows us that copyright law can indeed glean invaluable and
underappreciated operational insights from such interdoctrinal comparisons,
in the recognition that the law is indeed a “seamless web.”345

345

Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1093-94 (1975).
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